



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**NATIONALISM, MASS POLITICS, AND SPORT: COLD
WAR CASE STUDIES AT SEVEN DEGREES**

by

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June 2008

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE June 2008	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Nationalism, Mass Politics, and Sport: Cold War Case Studies at Seven Degrees			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Bart A. Buckel, Maj, U.S. Marine Corps				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>This study treats the role of sport in international relations in the Cold War. The era of nationalism and total war in the twentieth century produced one of the most violent periods in European history prior to, and including, World War II. The masses were mobilized around myths, legends, and symbols of extraordinary power. Sport and physical culture were viewed initially as a means of creating societies more fit for war and quickly became a tremendous social movement. Sports became a primary medium through which superiority propaganda was transmitted by various clubs, interest groups, governments, and states. Governments realized sport and physical culture's political potential, and the U.S. and U.S.S.R. became fully engaged in a war fought on ersatz battlefields comprised of soccer pitches, track fields, and hockey arenas during the Cold War. The twentieth century, particularly the Cold War era, provides several examples of sporting events deliberately planned with political gain in mind and instances where sporting results were intentionally exploited for governmental gain. The study of the history of such events provides one with a better understanding of the appeal of nationalist movements and how they can spiral out of control leading to violent nationalism if left unchecked.</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Nationalism, Mass Politics, Sport, Physical Culture, Gymnastics, Propaganda, Ideology, Olympics, De Coubertin, Hockey, National Identity, State, Government, Athlete, Symbolism, Communism, Socialism, Fascism, Cold War, Prague Spring, Czechoslovakia, Canada, United States, USA, Soviet Union, USSR, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Lacrosse			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 127	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

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**NATIONALISM, MASS POLITICS, AND SPORT:
COLD WAR CASE STUDIES AT SEVEN DEGREES**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(EUROPE, EURASIA)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

This study treats the role of sport in international relations in the Cold War. The era of nationalism and total war in the twentieth century produced one of the most violent periods in European history prior to, and including, World War II. The masses were mobilized around myths, legends, and symbols of extraordinary power. Sport and physical culture were viewed initially as a means of creating societies more fit for war and quickly became a tremendous social movement. Sports became a primary medium through which superiority propaganda was transmitted by various clubs, interest groups, governments, and states. Governments realized sport and physical culture's political potential, and the U.S. and U.S.S.R. became fully engaged in a war fought on ersatz battlefields comprised of soccer pitches, track fields, and hockey arenas during the Cold War. The twentieth century, particularly the Cold War era, provides several examples of sporting events deliberately planned with political gain in mind and instances where sporting results were intentionally exploited for governmental gain. The study of the history of such events provides one with a better understanding of the appeal of nationalist movements and how they can spiral out of control leading to violent nationalism if left unchecked.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Donald Abenheim who made me realize that history and culture are much more important than some would have us believe, and allowing me to pursue knowledge in something that actually interests me. I would also like to thank Professor Robert Looney for taking time early in the process of writing this thesis to guide me in the right direction, not to mention making the subject of economics interesting. Thank you both for your help during my labors.

To Professor Boris and Dr. Svetlana Keyser, and her sister Marina, thank you all for not only treating my physical pain for nearly a year, but taking the time to treat my mind as well. I shall miss your warm-heartedness, sincerity, and promotion of initiative. I am determined to remember to make time for myself and my wife, and will try to relax more often in the future.

To Dr. David Fittante, thank you for helping me find and take the first step along the road less travelled. I feel happy, relieved, sad, and scared right now.

To Hugh McNeil and Scott at the Physical Therapy facility on the Presidio of Monterey, thank you for guiding me through therapy for nearly eight months and being patient when my duties for school consistently negated my progress and prolonged the healing process.

To Gunnery Sergeant Stephen Lowe, USMC, “As I Said Before,” thank you for telling me there *was* a road less travelled.

To Major Allen “Cold Steel 6” Boothby, USMC (retired), thank you for being a mentor and a friend. You are my favorite philosopher.

To Colonel Paul Schreiber, Major Steven Greene, Gunnery Sergeant Phillip Jordan, and Sergeant Christopher Heflin, thank you for being Marines. I regret I will never have a chance to serve with any of you again.

Lastly, yet most of all, I want to thank my wife Melissa for standing by me and supporting me during my eighteen months at the Naval Postgraduate School, the absolute

worst eighteen months of my entire life, without a doubt. Through your commitment I have learned life is not about the Marine Corps. It is about those you love, and nothing is more important. It is conceivable I would no longer be here if it were not for you. I can think of no other human I would rather journey down the road less travelled with. I love you.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

National identity, mass politics and modern sport inter relate in a manner that informs the observer of European politics in a suggestive manner. In the years following World War I, sport became firmly rooted in domestic politics as politicians realized its potential as a vehicle for promoting political ideology. For instance, authoritarian leaders such as Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini used sport and physical culture as a medium through which they promoted nationalistic fervor in their Nazi and Fascist regimes respectively.

Diplomats ensured sport would become intertwined in international relations as several authoritarian states – Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy included – came to view international sporting competitions as what James Riordan refers to as “adjuncts to foreign policy” transforming sporting competitions into fierce rivalries where nation states jockeyed for political position and prestige.¹

It is within this context that the twentieth century’s Cold War provides us with manifestations of the rivalries between East and West, communism and capitalism, communism and social democracy, and oppressor and oppressed through international sporting competitions.

B. IMPORTANCE

Since the first Olympiad in approximately 776 B.C.² the impact of sport has ranged in purpose from the enhancement of the combat skills of soldiers to the establishment of diplomatic dialogue between states previously hostile towards each other. At the same time, as James Riordan put it in 1999, while serving as the head of the Department of Linguistics and International Studies at the University of Surrey in the

¹ Pierre Arnaud and James Riordan, ed., *Sport and International Politics* (London and New York: E & FN Spon, 1998), 1.

² Christopher R. Hill, *Olympic Politics: Athens to Atlanta 1896-1996* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), 6.

United Kingdom, sport “extends to and unites wider sections of the population than probably any other social activity...cutting across social, economic, educational, ethnic, religious and language barriers.”³

As the nation-state developed in the nineteenth century, sport and physical culture often played a role in the promulgation of nationalistic ideals as a feature of mass politics evidenced in the German ‘Turner’⁴ (gymnast) and the Czechoslovakian ‘Sokol’⁵ movements. Indeed, by 1896 when the modern Olympics were first held in Greece, national anthems and national flags were commonplace as citizens participated in frequently wild celebrations whenever their countrymen were victorious on the athletic fields.⁶ The second half of the nineteenth century had seen the triumph of nationalism as a mass movement in continental Europe and the pattern of the 1896 games in the era of nationalism in the age of imperialism has remained an important feature of sports and politics since then.

After World War II, sport and physical culture took on a more politically important role with the further growth of nations in decolonization and within the international system of the Cold War. Between Cold War opponents in the communist east and the capitalist west in the era of the 1950s through the 1980s, nationalistic pride was amplified through sporting victories which were often seen to provide proof of national superiority over an “inferior” opponent. As well, sport became a means through which the nation states of central and eastern Europe could mount a form of resistance – an ersatz war one could argue – to the Soviet hegemon without fear of retribution such as seen in Hungary’s water-polo victory at the 1956 Olympics⁷ and Czechoslovakia’s ice

³ Arnd Kruger and James Riordan, ed., *The International Politics of Sport in the Twentieth Century* (London and New York: E & F Spon, 1999), 49-50.

⁴ Arnaud and Riordan, ed., *Sport and International Politics*, 32.

⁵ James Riordan, ed., *Sport Under Communism: the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, the G.D.R., China, Cuba* (London: C. Hurst & Co, 1978), 57-58.

⁶ Martin van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 201-202.

⁷ Kruger and Riordan, *The International Politics of Sport in the Twentieth Century*, 19.

hockey victory at the World Ice Hockey Championships in 1969⁸, events which coincided with Soviet repression of subject nations in central Europe.

Undeniably, sport had significant political and social roles in the development of twentieth century socialist societies – most notably the Soviet Union – as the nation state controlled and guided many aspects of life, including that of sport and physical culture.⁹ Indeed, sport was used by politicians and government to mobilize and nationalize the masses in ways that actively contributed to heightened levels of group awareness and unity in the manner of nationalism since the nineteenth century. Such mass mobilization was integral to creating a strong national identity and states forged out of love of the fatherland¹⁰

As communist states – particularly the Soviet Union – continued to invest large amounts of resources into the development of their athletic programs over the years from the early 1950s throughout the 1980s, their victories in international sporting competitions – predominantly Olympic victories – increased.¹¹ Communist states used victories over capitalist states as a medium through which to spread propaganda of political and diplomatic superiority of the communist way of life.¹² The nuclear stalemate made war impossible, so the conflict of systems proceeded by other means and sporting victories were essentially the only way through which the east and west could

⁸ Kenneth N. Skoug, Jr., *Czechoslovakia's Lost Fight for Freedom, 1967-1969: An American Embassy Perspective* (Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 227-229.

⁹ Kruger and Riordan, *The International Politics of Sport in the Twentieth Century*, 49-50; James Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society: Development of Sport and Physical Education in Russia and the USSR* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 324-329; Reet Howell, "The USSR: Sport and Politics Intertwined," *Comparative Education* 1:2 (June 1975): 137-145; Don Anthony, introduction to *Sport Under Communism: the USSR, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, China, Cuba* ed. James Riordan (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 3-11.

¹⁰ Kruger and Riordan, *The International Politics of Sport in the Twentieth Century*, 48-51. See also Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society*, 174-175 and 181-182; Arnaud and Riordan, *Sport and International Politics*, 1 and 70-72; Riordan, *Sport Under Communism*, 49-51.

¹¹ Kruger and Riordan, ed., *The International Politics of Sport in the Twentieth Century*, 56-62.

¹² Andrew Strenk, "What Price Victory? The World of International Sports and Politics," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 445 (September 1979): 128-140.

prove their superiority over the other to the rest of the world as a form of cultural propaganda that was a central feature of the war of ideas in the cold war era¹³

Sport within the political conflict of the mid twentieth century's Cold War also witnessed the rise of such artifices as boycotts, visa denials, competition for rights to host major international sporting events, and sporting exchanges designed to enhance political position and prestige.¹⁴ One can see that sport can be a medium for acknowledging disapproval of the other in the international system, as well as for demonstrating and substantiating political practices and convictions. Indeed, few things can elevate a nation's pride and unity such as sporting victory can.¹⁵

In the globalizing world today, international sporting competitions may not be as heated as they once were during the Cold War era, but sport continues to be an important factor in reinforcing national identities. Indeed, in today's kinder, gentler Europe in which integration is a focus of the European Union, the soccer pitch is one place where racism and ethnic and national differences openly manifest themselves -- often in violent acts.

As previously pointed out sport has been used as a legitimate, often effective tool of government through such actions as boycotting sporting events or denying travel visas to athletes as a form of diplomacy and regulated conflict in how nations deal with each other. As well, sport is a way people can escape the reality that the world we live in can often be a horrible, dismal place. A world in which justice does not exist for large groups of people for no other reason than the color of their skin or the ancestors they had; where jobs and recognition are often given to lesser qualified or deserving people; where the accumulation of material things are more important than ensuring that every human has

¹³ Robert Jervis, "Perception, Misperception, and the End of the Cold War," in *Witnesses to the End of the Cold War*, ed. William C. Wohlforth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 220-239; and Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society*, 181-182.

¹⁴ Arnaud and Riordan, ed., *Sport and International Politics*, 11-12; Kruger and Riordan, ed., *The International Politics of Sport in the 20th Century*, 21-22 and 56-57; Jeremy Goldberg, "Sporting Diplomacy: Boosting the Size of the Diplomatic Corps," *The Washington Quarterly* 23:4 (Autumn 2000): 63-70.

¹⁵ Strenk, "What Price Victory?" 128-140.

access to clean water and air – sport, like alcohol or drugs, is a medium through which people can escape reality without the risk of drowning in their own despair.

The average citizen probably would not look twice at a magazine with yet another article about the spread of nuclear weapons – politicians are supposed to worry about this issue for him. Everyman tunes into ESPN in the morning while he’s eating breakfast because of what he really cares about – the previous evening’s sports scores. In his 1992 article “International Sports Law: A Replay of Characteristics and Trends,” James A. R. Nafziger put it bluntly when he stated “The public worships sports.”¹⁶ For this reason, analyses of specific cases from the Cold War era require careful elucidation.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Survey Monographs and Periodicals Germane to the Theme

Several schools of literature about nationalism, politics, sport, and the relationship among the three are relevant to this thesis: scholarship that deals primarily with the subject of national identity and nationalism; such that cover the history of sport, and the importance of its relationship to society and national identity; scholarship that discusses the connection of politics to sport – sport’s impact on politics as well as the government use of sport; and sources that are specifically related to the case studies of the international sporting victories over the Soviet Union in ice hockey by Czechoslovakia at the 1969 World Championship of Ice Hockey, Canada during the 1972 Summit Series, and the United States at the 1980 Winter Olympics.

The first category looks at the rise and spread of national identity, nationalism, and the nation-state. To begin with, Jared Diamond attempts to describe what he calls “a short history of everybody for the last 13,000 years” in *Guns, Germs and Steel*.¹⁷ Diamond’s efforts enlighten the reader to the notion that not only is our world a complicated and fascinating place to live in, but to truly understand who and what we are

¹⁶ James A. R. Nafziger, “International Sports Law: A Replay of Characteristics and Trends,” *The American Journal of International Law* 86:3 (July 1992): 489-518.

¹⁷ Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: A Short History of Everybody for the Last 13,000 Years*, (London: Vintage, 2005), 9.

today, we *must* understand the lessons of our past for our future.¹⁸ In his work *States, Nations and Nationalism*, Hagen Schulze lays out an outline of the history of the state and nation, within a European context since the middle ages.¹⁹ Patrick O’Neil sums up nationalism quite well in essentially stating that it is often created by a sense of national identity which can be described as an institution that, through a set of common political aims, connects people together – of course a nation of people sharing common qualities must be present in order for a national identity to exist. National identity often has ethnic or cultural origins, but can also grow from shared ideological beliefs. Nationalism can basically be seen as pride in one’s own self-governing political society that is separate from the society of others.²⁰ Martin Kilson may have influenced O’Neil’s work because in 1975 Kilson stated “ideology has been long recognized as a central factor in the birth and organization of...states.”²¹ Martin van Creveld also expands on the rise and spread of nationalism, and the emergence of the modern nation-state in his book *The Rise and Decline of the State. Nationalism*, edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, describes theories of nationalism, the rise of nations, nationalism in Europe and its relationship within an international system. Another edited work by Sima Godfrey and Frank Unger, *The Shifting Foundations of Modern Nation-States*, expands on nationalism and national identity in specific countries such as Russia and Canada.

The second group of literary sources addresses the history of sport and the importance of its relationship to society and national identity. In his 1979 article “What Price Victory? The World of International Sports and Politics,” Andrew Strenk provides us with a brief history of sport going back to the days of antiquity while offering several examples depicting the relationship among sport, society, and politics. Sport is a tremendous part of the lives of human beings today and the relationship of an individual can become highly personal. In *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*, Dr. Robert B.

¹⁸ Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel*, 11.

¹⁹ Hagen Schulze, *States, Nations and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present* (Cambridge and Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), xi.

²⁰ Patrick H. O’Neil, *Essentials of Comparative Politics* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), 47-49.

²¹ Martin Kilson, ed., *New States in the Modern World* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1975), ix.

Cialdini describes this relationship and links it to a need to associate oneself with accomplishment,²² something we can correlate to a national leader's desire that a national sporting team achieve victory in international competition – to increase prestige.

In “Sport and Civil Society,” Lincoln Allison tackles the claim that sport only reflects society and is of no other import itself. He goes on to give examples of how sport is an important component of civil society as well as continuing on to give other examples of how sporting organizations, acting independent of government, have actually checked government at times such as the British government's failed attempts to organize a boycott of the 1980 Olympics due to resistance from British sporting organizations.²³

Robert Washington and David Karen's work “Sport and Society” emphasize the relations of sport and society within the United States and they provide examples of how sport interconnects with other cultural and political institutions.

In their work of the same name as Washington and Karen's, James Frey and D. Stanley Eitzen recognize the prominence that sport holds within society and claim that sport is a “microcosm of society.”²⁴ “No other institution, except perhaps religion, commands the mystique, the nostalgia, the romantic ideational cultural fixation that sport does.”²⁵

The third grouping of study discusses the connection of politics to sport – its impact on politics as well as the government use of sport. Several of these works go on to address sport and socialism, specifically the way communist and fascist states used sport as a medium to encourage socialist ideology among their people. Strenk's previously mentioned article argues that the link between politics and sport is very strong, and that sport is a tool of government and politics – the link between which is not going

²² Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion* (New York: Quill William Morrow, 1993), 203.

²³ Lincoln Allison, “Sport and Civil Society,” *Political Studies* 46:4 (September 1998): 709-726.

²⁴ D. Stanley Eitzen and James H. Frey, “Sport and Society,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 17 (1991): 504.

²⁵ Ibid.

to disappear anytime soon.²⁶ Nafziger shares the same view as Strenk and Nafziger mentions as much in his previously mentioned article. In addition to Strenk's and Nafziger's writings, Jeremy Goldberg, Robert J. Paddick, Allan Guttman, and John Nauright provide several examples of how politics and sport intersect as well as several ways governments use sport as diplomatic tools. Goldberg even goes so far as to state that much like war, "sport is politics through other means."²⁷ In *Olympic Politics: Athens to Atlanta 1896-1996*, Christopher R. Hill expands on his claim that it is impossible to separate politics from international sporting competitions citing several examples from the modern Olympic Games dating back to when Baron Pierre de Coubertin fought hard to revive them in 1896.²⁸

Sport and International Politics, edited by James Riordan and Pierre Arnaud, provides further insight into the close ties of sport with national identity, and sport and international politics. It goes on to give examples of the relationship of sport to politics in several nations, as well as several examples of socialist societies' use of sport to promote the socialist ideology between the two World Wars debunking de Coubertin's belief that sport could serve as a conduit for peace. Reet Howell suggests that the Soviet Union was actually the first major, modern state to recognize "the full extent of the political significance of sport."²⁹ Other sources from authors including Vic Duke, Robert Edelman, and James Riordan go on to describe the social and political significance sport and physical culture had in the development of communist societies. The use of sport by communist governments contributed to an "us" versus "them" mentality which pitted communist society against capitalist society that was one of the conditions for making the particular case studies chosen for this thesis pertinent to understanding the relationship among mass politics, sport, and nationalism. We can also see the differing views the

²⁶ Strenk, "What Price Victory?" 128-140.

²⁷ Goldberg, "Sporting Diplomacy," 63-70.

²⁸ Hill, *Olympic Politics*, 1.

²⁹ Howell, "The USSR: Sport and Politics Intertwined," 137-145.

Soviet Union had with the western world in their views of sport and its relationship to politics and society in *Sport and Soviet Society* by James Riordan and *The Road to Olympus* by Anatoli Tarasov.

The last collection of sources is comprised of various books, articles, and interviews relating to sporting events relevant to this thesis as individual examples of a specific point or as one of the specific case studies. They include Scott Young's *War on Ice*, Jack Barry Ludwig's *Hockey Night in Moscow*, Joe Pelletier and Patrick Houda's *The World Cup of Hockey*, Robert Higham and Frederick W. Kagan's edited work *The Military History of the Soviet Union*, Simon Kuper's *Football Against the Enemy*, Alan Bairner's *Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization: European and North American Perspectives*, and a host of articles from print and web-based academic journals, magazines and newspapers such as the *British Journal of Political Science*, *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, *Sports Illustrated*, *The Hockey News*, *The Washington Post*, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, *The New York Times*, *The Economist*, *The Malta Independent Online*, *The International Herald Tribune*, and *The Financial Times*.

2. Major Approaches to the Topic

The major approach to the way in which mass politics, nationalism, and sport are related – specifically the impact sport has had on the development of political ideology and policies, and the rise and spread of national identity and nationalism – is that even though sport is closely tied to politics and nationalism, it has historically been neglected or discounted by scholars as having any significant, lasting impact. Not until the latter half of the twentieth century does the academic community begin to address the issue of sport and its relationship to government and mass politics in earnest. It seems that most scholars today will agree that sport and politics do intersect, but it is at what point that many seek to answer.

Much of the debate over the relationship among sport, nationalism, and mass politics is the way in which sport has influenced the latter. Baron de Coubertin would have liked to believe that sport – namely the Olympics – is lacking of politics, yet history is replete with examples of political controversies that have taken place in and around

sport of some kind. It is for this reason that understanding the intermingling of sport, nationalism, and mass politics is essential to understanding our world.

3. Major Questions and Argument

How has sport been used to shape national identity through mass politics? What role does sport serve in government and international relations? Will sport and international sporting competitions continue to have the impact in the future that they once enjoyed in the twentieth century?

A number of academics such as Jim Riordan, Andrew Strenk, and Arnd Kruger assert that sport can be an important and useful tool in the international relations among states. Additionally, they claim sport does play a significant role in politics as a platform through which victory can be seen to legitimize political systems and nations themselves.

In a 1979 article for *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Andrew Strenk stated that “sports serve as a tool of politics in one form or another – as a means of diplomatic recognition or isolation, as a vehicle of protest and propaganda, as a catalyst of conflict, as a way to gain prestige or further international cooperation, as a vehicle of internal social control, as a stimulus to modernization and unification.”³⁰ He goes on to provide numerous examples of sporting events with world wide political implications – both good and bad. His ultimate conclusion is that not only are modern sports, in a way, a “war without weapons,” but the intimate linkage between sports and politics is here to stay.³¹

One way that sport is used by government is as a medium through which to promulgate a national identity and promote nationalism. As the rise in national pride increases, the results can be very beneficial within a state. However, as a sense of identity increases, there is often the additional result of increased hostility towards others or those who do not share the same identity.

³⁰ Strenk, “What Price Victory?” 128-140.

³¹ Ibid.

The Cold War era provides one with examples of sport not only serving a significant role in the shaping of national identity, but it also provides examples of sport serving as the setting in which the ideologies of capitalism and communism competed openly in a battle for superiority on the international stage. As did several Olympiads, several international ice hockey competitions also took the place of actual nuclear or conventional war and served as ersatz battlegrounds in this context.

Through analysis of international ice hockey competition during the Cold War, one can see the manifestation of the hostility and tension between the communist east and the capitalist west. One can see how sport was used to reinforce national identities and nationalism, and how that nationalism fostered tension and hatred among citizens of different countries. One can see how sport was used as a source of defiance and rebellion against oppressive government. One can see how sport served as an ersatz battleground where sporting victories served as proxy battlefield victories proclaiming superiority of one society over another. Moreover, one can see that athletes are capable of engaging in fierce competition against political rivals of their governments, yet are still able to exhibit the highest form of nobility and humanity when the sporting competition has ended simply because of the bond they shared as athletes.

D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

1. Case Study, Comparative Study

Much of the academic literature that tackles the relationship among politics, nationalism, and sport focuses on football (soccer) and Olympiads, both of which seem to transcend more international and social boundaries than any other single sport or sporting event in the world. Some academic works address other sports to varying degrees such as rugby and gymnastics, but not with near the same frequency. Thus, arguments and debates on the topic may be slightly skewed because of the amount of attention paid to a limited variety of sport and sporting events.

This study reflects a review of academic records on the evolution of nationalism, the historical development of sport, and sport's importance in the promulgation of

nationalism and role in politics – particularly in the way government used sport for diplomatic purposes and the way sporting events impacted nations during the twentieth century.

The preponderance of the academic literature pertaining to sport focuses on examples from sports and games that easily transcend geographic and climatological boundaries. Three case studies involving ice hockey have been chosen in order to lend credence to the claim that sport is more than just a reflection of society and that it can be of significant importance not only to the shaping of national identity, but it can serve an important diplomatic function as well.

A ball and two goals are the only items really necessary to play soccer, and the construction of makeshift substitutes for those items is limited only to the imagination of those persons desiring to play. Ice hockey, on the other hand, not only requires the wearing of ice skates and the possession of the skill to skate prior to participating in it, but it requires a specific playing surface – ice. The puck, two goals, sticks, and protective equipment worn by the players can all be replaced with some other item to serve their purpose in the game, but the ice skates and an ice surface are absolutely necessary.

Ice hockey can only be played in specific climatologic conditions and it is predominantly played in Europe – to include Russia and the former Soviet Union – and North America. As well, it can be an expensive game to play and thus often is limited in universal availability without the aid of a charitable organization, thus inhibiting its popularity. There is little to no cost for those participating in soccer and many traditional Olympic events and they are therefore accessible by more people worldwide. If ice hockey games can be shown to have affected people outside of its natural sphere of influence, the legitimacy of sport itself as a medium of mass politics and diplomatic interaction is reinforced.

By researching cases of international ice hockey competition involving the Soviet Union and three other countries during the Cold War era, this paper aspires to determine if ice hockey, restrictive as it may be to a limited collection of the population, as a sport can affect politics and nationalism across the very boundaries that restrict it. If proven

so, it will support the argument that even though a sporting victory may not increase the size of a country's physical borders or be the leverage required to secure an international trade agreement, sport and sporting events are of such significant importance to enough people so that it surely weighs strongly in the founding of a national identity and the promulgation of nationalism. Moreover, it would demonstrate ice hockey, as a sport, provides governments a medium through which to publicly show support for or discontent with other governments without taking the further step of resorting to military demonstration of a stronger nature than merely making a verbal public statement.

2. Primary, Secondary, and Other Sources

Sources used to gain general insight into the history and evolution of nationalism, and the history of sport and its connection to nationalism and mass politics are scholarly works of a secondary nature. They include both books and journal articles.

Primary sources for all three case studies include interviews – face-to-face, telephonic, or written – with hockey players and officials, personnel working in politics, military officers, or regular citizens of the countries involved – most of who have a living memory of the events in question. The content of these interviews led to an appraisal of the impact on national pride and popular perception of the political impact the games had on the people who participated them, were spectators in some fashion, or had knowledge of them.

The remaining sources used are of the secondary variety. They include a host of books and articles centered on the specific cases of this thesis and place them within a larger historical and political perspective. Many of the secondary sources are accounts written by sportswriters and other journalists at the time these events were actually taking place. The last source requiring comment is a documentary entitled *The First Olympics*. In his effort to describe the culture and importance of the world renowned sporting event which has origins as a religious festival, producer Henry Schipper draws on interviews and commentary from such scholars as Professor Thomas F. Scanlon,

University of California, Riverside; Professor Anne Stewart, College Year in Athens; and Professor Ulrich Sinn, Deutsches Archäologisches Institut and author of *Olympia: Cult, Sport, and Ancient Festival*.³²

E. CHAPTER SUMMARY

This thesis is organized into six chapters, the current being the first which serves as an introduction. Chapter II is a synopsis of the histories and evolution of nationalism and sport. Beginning at the origin of the state, chapter two tracks the record of nationalism as it evolves into a type of secular religion over time before addressing the roles that it served prior to, and during the twentieth century. Chapter II then goes on to address the historical origins of sport and its relationship to the individual person's, as well as national identity. Rounding out chapter two are sections which discuss sport's relationship to mass politics, and government and international relations, through a historical analysis of its role in the fascist and totalitarian societies of the early twentieth century and then through the Cold War era.

The first chapter to deal with a case study, Chapter III begins by briefly illustrating the Soviet Union's rise to power and its subsequent domination of Eastern Europe in the twentieth century before discussing nationalism within multi-ethnic Czechoslovakia and the function sport served within that nationalism. The chapter then turns to the political events surrounding the Warsaw Pact's invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia, and the subsequent Czechoslovakian victory over the Soviet Union at the World Championship of Ice Hockey which set off anti-Soviet riots. The chapter concludes with the implications of that victory and the legacy it has left for Czechs and Slovaks alike.

Chapter IV shifts its focus westward as the Soviet Union, in the early stages of a period of détente with the West, saw an opportunity to show the world that their socialist system was superior to that of the capitalists in the West – and they would do it by

³² Henry Schipper, producer, *The First Olympics*, 1997 (A&E Television Networks, 2004).

beating the Canadians at their self-proclaimed national sport.³³ After setting the historical stage within the period of détente, chapter four highlights the extremely strong bond of ice hockey to Canada's national identity and the political gains the Soviet Union were looking to achieve through a victory. The chapter concludes with an account of how Paul Henderson, a Canadian hockey player, came to be revered by Canadians as somewhat of an idol as the man who saved the Canadian national identity.

In Chapter V, the thesis turns its attention to the rivalry between the two super-powers that had achieved hegemonic status in the post-World War II world. This chapter will address the situation in the world in the late 1970s, focusing primarily on the United States. The stage will be set as, yet again, the Soviet Union is faced with another opportunity through which to proclaim its superior status to the world – by defeating the U. S. national hockey team in the 1980 Winter Olympics in Lake Placid. This chapter provides insight into the composition of the teams – which one might argue was a reflection of each society – and contemplates the impact of the result of one hockey game on international relations and national pride.

The concluding chapter makes generalized conclusions about sport and its impact on national identity and nationalism, and its role in mass politics and international relations. This final chapter also makes some specific observations in reference to each of the case studies and the role of sport within each.

³³ Canada actually has two national sports, lacrosse in the summer and ice hockey in the winter, as designated by the National Sports of Canada Act in 1994. Sport Canada, "National Sports of Canada Act," Canadian Heritage, http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/sc/legislation/n-16_e.cfm (accessed August 7, 2008).

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II. NATIONALISM AND SPORT

A. NATIONALISM*

1. Definition and Origin

a. Definition

There are probably just as many versions of the definition of nationalism as there are people who still openly challenge the legitimacy of Brett Hull's controversial Stanley Cup-winning goal against the Buffalo Sabres in 1999 – a great many. For example, M. Crawford Young suggests one definition of nationalism could be “the assertion by a self-conscious group of the will to constitute an autonomous political community, whether or not the group coincides with a recognized state.”³⁴ Patrick O’Neil maintains nationalism is “a pride in one’s people and the belief that they have their own sovereign political destiny that is separate from those of others” – often created by a sense of national identity based in a series of institutions that connects people together through a set of common political aims.³⁵ Tilly asserts nationalism refers to “the mobilization of populations that do not have their own state around a claim to political independence” and “the mobilization of the population of an existing state around a strong identification with that state” – the latter version being encouraged by “homogenization of the population and the imposition of direct rule.”³⁶ Additionally, Ernest Gellner asserts:

nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases of the totality, of the population. It means that generalized diffusion of a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom,

* A concise description of the concept of nationalism is available in the section entitled “Nationalism” in *Decades of Crisis* by Ivan T. Berend.

³⁴ M. Crawford Young, “Nationalism and Separatism in Africa,” in *New States in the Modern World*, ed. Martin Kilson (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1975), 58.

³⁵ O’Neil contends that national identity often has ethnic or cultural origins, but can also grow from shared ideological beliefs such as the national identity found in the United States of America. O’Neil, *Essentials of Comparative Politics*, 47-49.

³⁶ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990* (Cambridge and Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990): 116.

codified for the requirements of reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication. It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of a previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves.³⁷

Mr. Gellner does not seem to approve of the reality of nationalism as much as this author approves the Detroit Red Wings hockey club.

Tom Nairn puts forward a possible dictionary-definition for sociology and political science students by proposing “*Nationalism*: infrequently used before the later nineteenth century, the term can nonetheless be traced back in approximately its contemporary meaning to the 1790s (Abbe Baruel, 1798). It denotes the new and heightened significance accorded to factors of nationality, ethnic inheritance, customs and speech from the early nineteenth century onwards.”³⁸

Hans Kohn suggests nationalism is a “state of mind,” adding

Such factors as language, territory, traditions – such sentiments as attachment to the native soil, *Heimat*, and to one’s kin and kind – assume different positions in the scale of values as communal psychology changes. Nationalism is an idea, and *idée-force*, which fills man’s brain and heart with new thoughts and new sentiments, and drives him to translate his consciousness into deeds of organized action. Nationality is therefore not only a group held together and animated by common consciousness; but it is also a group seeking to find its expression in what it regards as the highest form of organized activity, a sovereign state.³⁹

The list goes on, but one can see that the varieties of definitions for the concept of nationalism are many. Numerous scholars would probably agree, though, that nationalism is a concept of a national consciousness based within modern history partly on the evolution of several factors that include the shaping, often selectively, of a mythological history common to a desired group of people which can, and has, manifest

³⁷ Ernest Gellner, “Nationalism and High Cultures,” in *Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 65.

³⁸ Tom Nairn, “The Maladies of Development,” in *Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 70.

³⁹ Hans Kohn, “Western and Eastern Nationalisms,” in *Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 162.

itself in violent acts toward those people seen as not being the same – others. That is, nationalism relies on an image of the “other” be it the *Franzmann* or the *Ruskie* or what have you to operate as a force of mass politics and political mobilization.

In 1955, Boyd C. Shafer laid out several beliefs and conditions regularly at hand in order to provide a “reasonable way to get at the nature of nationalism.”⁴⁰ Several of those conditions and beliefs are:

- Some defined (often vaguely) territory (possessed or desired).
- Common cultural characteristics to include language and customs.
- Common dominant economic and social institutions.
- The possession of, or desire for, a common independent/sovereign government.
- Belief in a shared history and a common origin – either being real or fabricated.
- Loyalty and dedication to the idea of the nation that embodies the common geographic territory, culture, social and economic institutions, government, and fellow members of the nation – all greater than their sum.
- Pride in the accomplishments of the nation and a sense of mourning in its misfortune – often military in nature.
- A shared sense of ambivalence toward or enmity toward “others” not of the same nation.
- A yearning for future glory and greatness of the nation.

Shafer’s observations are strengthened as Ivan T. Berend identifies “Standardized national languages, education, military service, literacy, mass consumption, and public transportation systems” as characteristics that lend to the creation of a “uniform national consciousness.”⁴¹

Many, if not all, of these conditions and beliefs can be traced back to the earliest times when they may or may not have been applicable to various family units, clans, tribes, even the city-states of ancient Greece. However, many scholars would argue that nationalism as an ideology established itself in the latter portion of the eighteenth century. The ideology did not just come into existence at the whim of

⁴⁰ Boyd C. Shafer, “Toward a Definition of Nationalism,” in *Nationalism: Myth and Reality*, Boyd C. Shafer, *Nationalism and International Progress*, ed. Urban G. Whitaker, Jr. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1960), 4.

⁴¹ Ivan T. Berend, *Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1998), 51.

some wizard, king, or religious leader. It needed a springboard, fertile soil in which to grow. That fertile soil was the state.

b. Origin – State Growth, Expansion, and Transformation into the Nation-State

O'Neil provides a simplified explanation of this process. Scholars agree that early humans most likely first existed as hunter-gatherers in small family groups who eventually developed agriculture and the domestication of animals which led to a non-nomadic lifestyle in order to ensure food production took place. As food surpluses developed, non-food-producing specialists arose within societies who, combined with a sedentary lifestyle that provided them time to innovate, set the stage for technological advancement.⁴²

Larger and larger societal groups of people began to develop such as the clan, tribe, and chiefdom. As the societies grew, so did inequality among humans – resulting mainly from the fact that those with more skills could become specialists who were able to generate more wealth and power. Societies continued to grow, as did the inequality, and chiefs were no longer able to manage quarrels amongst their people. This led to the creation of laws and rules, along with organizations designed to enforce them and pass judgment on disputes. Tribes and clans grew to have rulers and leaders, eventually developing into city-states and ultimately empires.⁴³

O'Neil asserts that the modern state – the nation-state – has its origins in Europe at a time when the Roman Empire was dominant. When the Roman Empire collapsed, those things the empire provided for its people disappeared – the political institutions and security the legions had provided essentially faded away and anarchy set in giving way to all types of would-be leaders, from bandit to warlord, who emerged in an attempt to gain advantage over the other in an ensuing period of constant warfare – the

⁴² O'Neil, *Essentials of Comparative Politics*, 26; Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel*, 260-261.

⁴³ O'Neil, *Essentials of Comparative Politics*, 25-28. A much more detailed description of this process is available in van Creveld's *The Rise and Decline of the State* as it is entirely devoted to the state, though primarily from a Eurocentric perspective. Diamond's *Guns, Germs, and Steel* also describes the same process along with several other elements of human history, taking into account the many different cultures from around the globe.

Dark Ages from approximately 500 to 1000 C. E. As time wore on, the fighting spawned a sort of rapid evolution of political organizations as those that were stronger and more effective adapted and overcame, while the less successful and weaker were conquered and vanished – political/social Darwinism if you like.⁴⁴

The political organization that was the “fittest” was the state – why? The leaders who promoted economic advancement by creating rules, laws, and infrastructure that valued and allowed freedom, equality, private land and property ownership saw an increase in the production of their subjects. Increased production meant that more resources existed for leaders to tax – and those taxes often became the means with which to wage war. Additionally, leaders who encouraged technological advancement saw economic development rise even more as new goods and services were provided – not to mention the fact that improved technology often meant better weapons and means of defense.

O’Neil continues that technological advancement and a state’s willingness to allow private enterprise set the stage for modern capitalism – private property, free markets, and the pursuit of wealth through investment. Around the time of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as internal security improved, the ability of the populace to travel and interact with each other increased, allowing people to enjoy the benefits of capitalism. This caused an increase in trade, and population centers began to grow where markets and seats of government existed. These cities also served as centers of social interaction and cultural development in which people similar to each other began to congregate. People from different backgrounds and ethnicity intermarried, languages often merged with one another, common religious practices increased and new identities were frequently formed. States asserted more sovereign control and introduced standard languages and standardized education, roads and railroads improved travel, and as people interacted with people from other cultures more often, they began to gain a sense of a shared ethnic identity with others similar to themselves. As common ethnic identities

⁴⁴ O’Neil, *Essentials of Comparative Politics*, 28-30. Schulze also asserts that this period of near constant warfare in Europe ultimately led to the emergence of the modern state in *States, Nations and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present*, 37-38.

formed, standardized languages, education systems, military service, and mass consumption were some of the means used to promulgate oft fabricated myths about the origins, race, and culture of the people whose interests the state claimed to protect and pursue. Thus, the state was depicted as the personification of the people themselves and a national identity was created.⁴⁵

Schulze contends that the national identity would “seize the minds of the masses, rising above all individual interests and ideologies and binding the nation to its state.”⁴⁶ National identity allowed rulers and leaders of the state to mobilize the public as they had never been able to before. George L. Mosse tells us that by the eighteenth century, states were able to raise large armies funded through mass taxation that gave their allegiance to the ideal of their nation and its glory, not a royal dynasty – popular sovereignty had replaced royal sovereigns. Popular sovereignty was a celebration of the people and their will. The celebration of the people became the worship of the nation – a new “secularized religion.”⁴⁷

Making reference to a previous conclusion about the nation by Ernest Renan, Schulze claims “a nation is a state of mind, a community that exists as long as it is willed and lives in the hearts and minds of its members and which perishes when it no longer exists in the thoughts and aspirations. Nations are founded on national awareness. Nations come to know themselves through their common history, their common reputation and the sacrifices they have made in common.”⁴⁸ He continues “nations existed before they were so called, as a sense of community rooted in collective emotions, as language, shared traditions and simple comradeship in arms – features that aspire to permanence, and in fact offered permanence, thus setting up fertile and dynamic tensions in relation to states.”⁴⁹

⁴⁵ O’Neil, *Essentials of Comparative Politics*, 30-31 and 51-52.

⁴⁶ Schulze, *States, Nations and Nationalism*, 91.

⁴⁷ George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1975), 1-2.

⁴⁸ Schulze, *States, Nations and Nationalism*, 97-98.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 113.

The worship of the people and the nation state via the secular religion of nationalism manifested itself in the reinforcement of historical and cultural myths through celebratory festivals, grandiose architecture and the erection of monuments, and theater. For example, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, who was also instrumental in the German gymnastic movement in the early nineteenth century, was influential in the creation of festivals and monuments celebrating great Germanic deeds and persons such the peasant revolt during the Middle Ages and Hermann the Cheruskan who defeated the Roman Legions in the Battle of the Teutoburger Forest.⁵⁰ Indeed, Europe is replete with national heroes who are revered as part of the national identity of different nation-states: Viriathus in Spain, Boadicea in Britain, Vercingetorix in France, and Civilis in the Netherlands to name a few.⁵¹

The secular religion of the national consciousness usurped the foundation of society that had existed for so many centuries – the three estates of the church, nobility, then everyone else.⁵² People came to see themselves as citizens, rather than subjects, of nations with their own unique cultural and political identities in pursuit of national independence and sovereignty – one need only look to Napoleonic France to see a classic example of this having taken place.⁵³

2. The Age of Imperialism

As economies grew, more money meant larger armies could be created and states conducted warfare against one another in order to feed their lust for conquest – the loser normally being absorbed by the victor. When states ran out of land on the European continent, they set their sights on foreign shores extending their empires and forcing the organizational structure of the state onto the rest of the world.⁵⁴ It is arguable that loyalties and identities were, at one point, imposed by those who ruled and were nothing more than a lord being loyal to his king because of the system of feudalism. One would fight for a king for no other reason than that the king allowed that individual to live on the king's land in

⁵⁰ Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 54 and 75.

⁵¹ Schulze, *States, Nations and Nationalism*, 96.

⁵² Berend, *Decades of Crisis*, 51. Berend does not specifically mention the three estates, though he alludes to them.

⁵³ O'Neil, *Essentials of Comparative Politics*, 53.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 31-32.

return for service in wartime. The loyalty did not extend to the king, but to the act of being obliged to return a service for some sort of commodity. Have no doubt, societies transformed over time, and with them so have the role of the people within those societies. By the time the nation-state had come into existence, the monarchs that were common to Europe in the era prior to the mid-eighteenth century no longer had complete and unchallenged sovereignty over a land and its people purely by virtue of birthright and title. Societies of Europe had changed and the rulers of Europe now had a responsibility to the people, the citizens, of the state in which they ruled just as those citizens now had responsibility to the state instead of the monarch. In the creation of national identity, nationalism, then, is a key component to the rise of the nation-state. By the time European colonies were established in the Americas and other parts of the globe, things had begun to change. This is highly evident in the era of European imperialism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The imperial powers of Europe used their colonial assets for economic gain and as a means of increasing their status among the international community. They had administrators in the colonies only to look after those affairs which were necessary to extract the natural resources from the land and provide markets for their own economic goods. Though some of the indigenous personnel did benefit from the colonial presence, the vast majority were simply exploited purely for the imperial powers' gain. This was obviously not to the liking of many of those subjected to the colonial rule, and the territories were mostly controlled by bureaucracy and military force.⁵⁵

Bureaucratic institutions were eventually required for the imperial powers to continue the growth of colonial assets. In order to govern the territories, infrastructure such as those in home countries were established – schools, police forces, legal systems, taxation controls, road networks, hospitals, etc. Though benefits such as longer life expectancies and increased rights for women resulted, the traditions and cultures of the imperial powers also wore on local traditions and cultures creating conflict over identity.⁵⁶

Indeed, the era of imperialism implemented by the European powers can be viewed as the era that gave the nation-state rise in those parts of the world outside of

⁵⁵ Young, "Nationalism and Separatism in Africa," 58.

⁵⁶ O'Neil, *Essentials of Comparative Politics*, 225-227.

Europe and North America. As the populations in colonial territories were subjected to more and more injustices, their sense of national identity and nationalism grew in objection to the colonial rule. By the 19th and 20th centuries, colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean were on their way to decolonization because of nationalist movements and the peoples' desires for self-rule. Colonialism provided the embryo in which the nation-state would gestate.⁵⁷

3. The Twentieth Century

During the twentieth century, a series of world and cold wars set the stage for European empires to grant sovereignty to more and more of their subjects who pressed for independence largely based on ethnic or nationalistic reasons. Earth eventually became a world of nation-states comprised of populations who were now citizens of their states, not subjects of them. While the growth and development of the nation-state – a homogenization process – took several hundred years in Europe, the rest of the world was essentially compelled to take on the state form of organization – often alien to their cultures – out of necessity or through force.⁵⁸

National identity and nationalism had spread among the world and by 1914 nationalism was quite prevalent in Europe. Interwar Central and Eastern Europe would become a festering wound where the maggots of nationalism laid by the flies that negotiated the Treaty of Versailles would mature into the gangrene of World War II. As Kohn recounts, numerous peoples had been “liberated” and formed their own sovereign nations upon the conclusion of the war in 1918. In opposition to the pre-war British trend of granting more equality and recognition of human rights in several of its colonial holdings from Ireland to India, the establishment of new nation-states after the war did not follow this trend. Many of the previously oppressed became oppressors themselves upon achieving independence. Territorial disputes increased. Nationalistic myths and traditions were pursued with a lack of consideration for humanity toward the “others”. People tyrannized racial and ethnic relatives such as occurred to Slovaks in

⁵⁷ O'Neil, *Essentials of Comparative Politics*, 228-229.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 33.

Czechoslovakia, Ukrainians in Poland, and Croats in Yugoslavia. Thus, nationalistic fervor during this time posed a serious threat to international peace and human liberty.⁵⁹ Events in Central and Eastern Europe during the interwar years exemplify Hans Morgenthau's statement that "yesterday's oppressed cannot help becoming the oppressors of today because they are afraid lest they be again oppressed tomorrow".⁶⁰

Nationalist movements became stronger as authoritarian states such as Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union turned to socialism, fascism, and communism as answers to problems of mass politics in the wake of the failure of liberal democracy.⁶¹ For example, Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime exploited the German people's sense of national identity and racial superiority in order to stir up an emotional fervor that allowed them to instill great powers upon the German state which would bring the world to war again in 1939. The racial hatred the Nazis spread, as well as that of other regimes and ethnic groups throughout the continent did not go unnoticed. In 1936 biologist Julian Huxley and anthropologist A. C. Haddon published *We Europeans: A Survey of "Racial" Problems* in which Huxley and Haddon maintain:

The violent racialism to be found in Europe today is a symptom of Europe's exaggerated nationalism: it is an attempt to justify nationalism on a non-nationalist basis, to find a firm basis in objective science for ideas and policies which are generated internally by a particular economic and political system, and have a real relevance only in reference to that system. The cure for the racial myth, with its accompanying self-exaltation and persecution of others, which now besets Europe, is a re-orientation of the nationalist ideal, and the practical sphere, and abandonment of claims by nations to absolute sovereign rights.⁶²

Upon the conclusion of World War II in 1945, many of the states that had been conquered by Nazi Germany had been restored. However, the Soviet Union effectively

⁵⁹ Hans Kohn, "A New Look at Nationalism," in *The Virginia Quarterly Review* 32 (Summer 1956), *Nationalism and International Progress*, ed. Urban G. Whitaker, Jr. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1960), 21-22.

⁶⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau. "Nationalism: Dilemma," in *Dilemmas of Politics*, Hans J. Morgenthau, *Nationalism and International Progress*, ed. Urban G. Whitaker, Jr. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1960), 104.

⁶¹ Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel*, xii.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 103.

absorbed several states in the East, such as the Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, as it grew into one of the two post-war entities that would compete for hegemony in the world – the other being the United States which would enjoy a dominant influence in the West.⁶³ The United States and the Soviet Union had established themselves as the two main actors in their respective spheres of influence that existed after the war. These two countries would shape the world from 1945 until 1991 when, after Klaus Meine and the Scorpions would release the song “Wind of Change” on the album *Crazy World*,⁶⁴ the Soviet Union disintegrated as many of its former member states declared their independence once again.

Nationalism in the East was frowned upon by the Soviet Union which was not afraid to put down independence movements with force as they showed in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.⁶⁵ For the most part, the Soviet sphere of influence and the Warsaw Pact were held together largely by intimidation.

Contrary to the trend in the East, parliamentary democracy encouraged by the United States created an atmosphere in the West that embraced the elimination of ideology from politics and promoted cooperation among different population groups who had been subject to large migrations and social upheaval as a result of the war.⁶⁶ The West came to associate democracy with victory and economic prosperity, and united once again in opposition to another foe – the communist East led by the Soviet Union.⁶⁷ The era of competition between the East and West after the Second World War known as the Cold War is the era in which the case studies selected for this thesis would take place.

Over time, as societies went through a transformation from where leadership was carried out by the guy with the biggest stick to a place where institutions abound in labyrinth-filled bureaucracies of state sponsored government in what we now know as the modern-

⁶³ Schulze, *States, Nations and Nationalism*, 305-307.

⁶⁴ The rock ballad “Wind of Change,” written by Klaus Meine and performed by the German rock band the *Scorpions* in 1990, swept Europe and North America in a popular and powerful statement that the world order of the time was in a state of upheaval and revolution, evident in the independence movement in the Baltic states in early 1990. It is unlikely that the song was the impetus for independence movements after 1990, but the song certainly had a significant impact on younger generations and it was commonly used in news and documentary footage of the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

⁶⁵ Schulze, *States, Nations and Nationalism*, 310-311.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 312.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 312-314.

nation state, mankind's sense of identity also went through a transformation from that of an individual to that of being a vital part of something much larger and, supposedly, more important than the self – the nation-state. Men and states used several means through which to promulgate their favored ideologies in shaping individual and national identities. Sport is one of those means.

B. SPORT

1. History of Sport and the Rise of the Olympics

a. Ancient Olympics

Contrary to the musings of American comedian and modern-day philosopher George Carlin, there are more than just three sports and a sport does not necessarily require the use of a ball.⁶⁸ For purposes of this thesis, the term *sport* will be used liberally to refer to such things as physical exercises designed for therapeutic purposes, physical exercises designed for competition such as gymnastics, active leisure pursuits such as hunting or equestrian activities or skiing, and organized physical competition based on rules and regulations with the intent on producing a result with a winner or loser – individual or team-based. Sorry George.

Modern sport can be seen to have its origins at the ancient Olympic Games. First held in 776 B. C. at Olympia, Greece, the ancient Olympics celebrated beauty in proportion, balance, strength, and the agony of the duel between men in the setting of a religious festival honoring the Greek god Zeus – in the beginning there was only one event, a footrace to the altar of Zeus symbolizing the sacrifice of energy for the god.⁶⁹

The ancient games were held every four years and continued for approximately twelve centuries uninterrupted with participants and spectators attending from as far west as Marseilles and as far east as areas near the Black Sea in modern-day

⁶⁸ Carlin insists that only three sports exist: baseball, basketball, and [American] football. Anything else generally regarded as a sport among the societies of the world is just a game or an activity from Carlin's viewpoint. George Carlin, *Napalm and Silly Putty* (New York: Hyperion, 2001), 106.

⁶⁹ Hill, *Olympic Politics*, 6; Schipper, *The First Olympics*.

southern Russia.⁷⁰ Safe travel for participants and spectators was made possible by an official three-month truce, enforced by the Spartans, allowing warring peoples to send representatives.⁷¹

The usefulness of sport and athletics to the ancient Greeks in the preparation for war is evident in the types of events comprising the ancient Olympics: wrestling, boxing, sprinting, chariot races, javelin, and the pankration.⁷² Indeed, the final event of the ancient Olympics was a footrace conducted by hoplites – ancient Greek foot soldiers – in full kit.⁷³

The first day of the ancient Olympic festival was filled with religious rites and competitors were required to take an oath to Zeus in which they declared their commitment to compete fairly and obey the rules.⁷⁴ Cheating was not only frowned upon, it was despised and offenders were eternally humiliated in statues erected near the stadium where the footraces were held resulting in great shame for the wrongdoer.⁷⁵ In fact, runners who jumped early in anticipation of the start of their races were often beaten with rods.⁷⁶

Other Greek athletic festival existed, but none associated with the splendor, beauty, and glory of those in Olympia.⁷⁷ Tens of thousands of spectators would attend the festival as it was of tremendous social importance – it was the place to see and to be seen. Aristotle, Socrates, and Plato all attended Olympic festivals, much as celebrities today attend Los Angeles Lakers games, and Herodotus was even known to have told his stories to throngs of people from the back of the temple of Zeus.⁷⁸ Not only

⁷⁰ Schipper, *The First Olympics*.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Strenk, “What Price Victory?” 131; Schipper, *The First Olympics*.

⁷³ Schipper, *The First Olympics*.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ W. M. Hugill, “Olympics Old and New,” *Phoenix* 3:1 (Spring 1949): 34; Schipper, *The First Olympics*.

⁷⁶ Schipper, *The First Olympics*.

⁷⁷ Hill, *Olympic Politics*, 6; Strenk, “What Price Victory?” 131-132.

⁷⁸ Schipper, *The First Olympics*.

did the people go to the Olympic festival to watch the athletes participate, but they would have attended for the splendor of the festival surrounding the games and to behold the multitude of beautiful sculptures, architecture and artwork at the holy site – the statue of Zeus in the temple was one of the seven wonders of the world when it existed.⁷⁹

Strenk contends that central to Greek culture at the time was the concept of the ‘agon’ or contest, the root of the modern English word ‘agony’. The ‘agon’ was the essence of Greek sport and victory in Olympic events brought fame, wealth, prestige, and sometimes godly status to the athletes. Victory was a way in which an athlete could ensure he or she were immortalized in song, stories, or sculpture as there was no afterlife in the Greek religion thus competition enticed even influential persons such as Alcibiades, Nero, and Alexander the Great.⁸⁰

Victors were idolized and lavished with gifts and admiration. For example, sweat from victorious athletes was bottled and sold as magical elixirs, and in Athens, winners were provided free meals for life and granted a stipend worth approximately \$110,000 in modern currency.⁸¹ The ancient Olympic Games not only brought fame and admiration to the participants, but the politicians and city-states they represented benefited as well. “Those who enjoyed political power or wished to acquire it for themselves or their families found it convenient to be near successful athletes in order to utilize the aura of prestige for their own gain.”⁸²

An archeological discovery by Dr. Ulrich Sinn of the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut in the 1990s provides evidence that the ancient games continued to around 500 A. D.⁸³ The ancient games

appealed to the Greek love of autonomy while, at the same time, reinforcing the pride in Hellenism. The various Greek city states identified closely with their citizens who were competing. The gathering

⁷⁹ Schipper, *The First Olympics*.

⁸⁰ Strenk, “What Price Victory?” 132.

⁸¹ Ibid., 132; Schipper, *The First Olympics*.

⁸² Strenk, “What Price Victory?” 132.

⁸³ Schipper, *The First Olympics*.

of Greeks from all over the known world reinforced the consciousness of being Greek and kept alive those religious, educational, and cultural traditions which separated the Greeks from the barbarians.⁸⁴

Ancient Greeks had revered proportion, balance, strength and beauty within the individual – a reverence that would influence the likes of Ludwig Jahn, Adolf Hitler, and Benito Mussolini in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

b. Modern Olympic Movement

Pride in one's nation and political influence are still prevalent today in the modern Olympics. David B. Kanin puts forward four factors he contends led to the creation of the Olympic system as part of international political relations: "the tradition of the ancient Games and the interest aroused in them by nineteenth-century archaeologists, the European exercise movement and its national implications, English sport and the English public school system under the influences of Thomas Arnold, and the personal will and determination of Baron Pierre de Coubertin."⁸⁵

Disappointed and humiliated by the French loss in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), de Coubertin assembled the ideals that became the modern Olympic movement. He believed that France could be strengthened through the introduction of sport and athletic programs based on the British model. De Coubertin "sought a cure for the physical and moral decadence of a nation 'on the playing fields of Eton' and in the pursuit of manly sport which he recognized as a distinctive feature of British public schools, and which he believed to be the key to British greatness."⁸⁶ After all, France was leading the way in art, architecture, and the intellectual and technical worlds.⁸⁷ Why should they continue to fall behind in the sporting world?

⁸⁴ Strenk, "What Price Victory?" 132.

⁸⁵ David B. Kanin, *A Political History of the Olympic Games* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), 9-10.

⁸⁶ Hugill, "Olympics Old and New," 37; Arnd Kruger, "The unfinished symphony: A history of the Olympic Games from Coubertin to Samaranch," in *The International Politics of Sport in the 20th Century*, ed. Arnd Kruger and James Riordan (London and New York: E & FN Spon, 1999), 3.

⁸⁷ Kruger, "The unfinished symphony," 3.

De Coubertin “came to see sports as a vehicle for furthering international friendship and understanding, thereby bringing about the goal sought by many thinkers of his day – universal world peace.”⁸⁸ In 1894 he established what would become the International Olympic Committee (IOC) believing this would bring world youths together and create friendly relationships among the different ethnic and cultural peoples of the world.⁸⁹ He felt those relationships would be the first step toward a universal world peace and would jump-start a movement in which relationships would be established in other areas such as politics, education, and cultural exchanges.⁹⁰

Though filled with dignified intent, what de Coubertin failed to realize was that he had actually politicized sport even more. “The IOC’s very claims of internationalism, moralism and independence thrust it squarely into the realm of politics...decisions to introduce national flags and hymns into the victory ceremonies and to designate competitors according to their country promoted politics and nationalism during the Games.”⁹¹ The modern Olympics became yet another kiln in which nationalistic ideology could be cooked by politicians and diplomats. Authoritarian regimes such as the Nazis in Germany and the Fascists in Italy quickly took to using sport as a medium through which to spread their political, diplomatic, and ideological propaganda.⁹²

2. Relationship to the Self

In 1991, sociologists James H. Frey and D. Stanley Eitzen contended that “No other institution, except perhaps religion, commands the mystique, the nostalgia, the romantic ideational cultural fixation that sport does. No other activity so paradoxically combines the serious with the frivolous, playfulness with intensity, and the ideological with the structural.”⁹³ Why is this? Why would a person put so much stock in sport

⁸⁸ Strenk, “What Price Victory?” 138.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 139.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid., 139.

⁹³ Eitzen and Frey, “Sport and Society,” 504.

when there are so many other things in the world that some could argue are more important? Evident from the discussion about the ancient Olympics is the fact that sport can provide the athlete with a rather large degree of self-accomplishment and pride, not to mention a livelihood.

What about the non-participant though; the observer, the fan? Why do fans go to such great lengths to get photographs with athletes, to get their autographs or uniforms? What causes such hatred among fans that they start riots and maul fans from opposing teams at football matches in Europe? What would cause a fan to pose death threats to players or referees they hold responsible for the loss of a match or game? Why are athletes honored in prolific ceremonies retiring the number they wore while they played for a particular team or are being inducted into a sports hall-of-fame?

Robert Cialdini provides an interesting account of a World War II combat veteran in an effort to answer the questions above in *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*. Shortly after the war, the soldier stopped speaking altogether and medical examination produced no physical cause – no wounds, brain damage or impairment of his vocal cords. The soldier was still able to read, write, and understand others. Perplexed, his doctors moved him to a veterans' hospital where he remained for thirty years without ever saying a word, regressing more and more into social seclusion.

One day, a radio in the ward the soldier was housed in was tuned to a soccer match between the team from his hometown and a rival team. At a vital point in the match, the referee called a penalty against a player from the soldier's home team. Immediately the soldier leapt from his chair and screamed his first words in over thirty years: "You dumb ass! Are you going to *give* them the match?!" He then sat down in silence, never to speak again.⁹⁴

Cialdini maintains the truth of this story and identifies two lessons to be learned. First, the absolute desire of the veteran to have his team win was so utterly strong that it was the sole instigator for the departure from his entrenched lifestyle. Similar effects from sporting events are not uncommon. When the U. S. hockey team defeated the

⁹⁴ Cialdini, *Influence*, 195-196.

Soviet team in the 1980 Winter Olympics, even people who were not in attendance went wild. In Cambridge, Massachusetts, a toilet paper riot broke out at a grocery store as customers and employees threw rolls up and down the aisles. In Raleigh, North Carolina, a swim meet was stopped as spectators erupted in chants of “U.S.A.! U.S.A.!” when the result of the hockey game was announced.⁹⁵

The second thing to be learned from the account of the soldier is that the link between sport and the sports fan is that it is of a very personal nature. The scrap of self-identity the soldier still held was stimulated by soccer. Cialdini’s reasoning is that the soldier felt that he, personally, would be diminished by his home team’s loss through the principle of association. Something as trivial as being born in the same place the soccer team represented inextricably linked him to the victory the team would enjoy or the defeat it would suffer. Cialdini makes reference to a statement by the author Isaac Asimov made describing human reactions to competitions, “All things being equal, you root for your own sex, your own culture, your own locality...and what you want to prove is that *you* are better than the other person. Whomever you root for represents *you*; and when he wins, *you* win.”⁹⁶

When viewed in this context, a fan’s passion for sport becomes understandable and why hometown crowds worship their ‘boys.’ In this world full of people with varying degrees of mental illness and depression, acknowledged or not, human beings have a desire – a *need* – to possess a sense of self-worth. A victory for a team is one way a person proves superiority – at least in their own minds. When a team wins, in a way it legitimizes the intellect of the fan that was smart enough to choose that team to support. “If we can surround ourselves with success that we are connected with in even a superficial way...our public prestige will rise.”⁹⁷ Just as the ancient Greeks, modern-day humans attempt to associate themselves with victorious athletes.

⁹⁵ Cialdini, *Influence* 196.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 196-198.

⁹⁷ Cialdini, *Influence*, 198.

On the other hand, when a team loses, people have a tendency to separate themselves from the team and the loss. Cialdini describes an experiment in which researchers counted the number of team-related items of clothing worn by college students on campus the Monday following football games at several universities including Louisiana State, Ohio State, Southern California, Michigan, and Notre Dame. Results of the experiment showed that when a team won, more clothing was worn. A similar experiment involved telephonic interviews requiring participants to describe games from the previous weekend. When the home teams won, people were more likely to use pronouns such as 'we' and 'our.' When the home teams lost, the pronouns used more often were 'they' and 'they're.' Humans deliberately manipulate the visibility of their connections with athletes and teams in an effort to make themselves look better to anyone who may notice the connections.⁹⁸ Just consider the number of times an acquaintance has beamed when telling you about the time, or times, they have attended sporting events and sat in a corporate box.

What type of person is it that hangs around arena parking lots in freezing temperatures to get an autograph from a hockey player or stays up until the wee hours of the morning on a work night to place a winning bid for a game-worn jersey on eBay or hangs pictures in their restaurant of themselves with famous athletes? Cialdini puts forward the notion that they are not just fans; they are people with personality flaws – a low sense of self-worth and self-esteem that drives them to seek cachet from advertising their associations with the accomplished.⁹⁹

If Cialdini is correct about people trying to make themselves look good by association with success, even a loose association, then logically people would be most apt to do this when they don't look or feel very good or when times are tough on them. When a public image is soiled, humans experience a heightened need to re-establish that image by touting their ties with success. Concurrently, people will make an attempt to disassociate themselves with failure and have a tendency to look for others to blame for

⁹⁸ Cialdini, *Influence*, 199-200.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 203.

the failure.¹⁰⁰ The inter-war period between the world wars in Europe was rampant with economic strife, hunger, unemployment, humiliation, death, and despair. It was the perfect breeding ground for the rise of authoritarian regimes and charismatic figures to preach a message of hope through the manipulation of nationalistic ideals and identify a scapegoat for their suffering at which to focus their animosity – Jews.

3. The Link to Nationalism and Mass Politics

a. Gymnastics...is a Sport?!

Though gymnastics would most likely not be considered a sport by numerous laymen on the subject, it remains that the gymnastic movements of the nineteenth century served a significant role in the evolution of European culture and identity. Furthermore, though not intentionally to disappoint Mr. Carlin, it serves this thesis well to consider gymnastics – certainly a component of physical culture – within the context of sport as stated earlier.

Physical beauty, strength, agility, poise, and composure under pressure were all heavily valued by the ancient Greeks. One did not achieve these attributes from a sedentary lifestyle pinning over parchment filled with text and conducting oratory in bathhouses. Dedicated physical training and commitment to success and glory were required if one was to achieve such attributes. This ideology was influential in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to many of the European elites, particularly in Germany.

For many Germans during the eighteenth century – Friedrich Schiller for example – beauty was the unifying element in society. It related what was common to all members of society, for beauty was considered a timeless absolute that could bring out the capacity for perfection in all men. The beautiful could unite opposites in human nature: strength and passivity, freedom and law. ‘Beauty,’ then, was an ideal type arising from that which endures in a man’s character and, through this, penetrating his condition in life and ennobling it.¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ Cialdini, *Influence*, 200-201.

¹⁰¹ Berend, *Decades of Crisis*, 24.

Men such as Ludwig Jahn saw gymnastics as the medium through which to achieve this ideal type. In 1811 Jahn founded the German gymnastic movement with the intent to “train fighters for the liberation of Germany.”¹⁰² Jahn and his gymnasts were trailblazers in German national self-representation. “Love of fatherland through gymnastics,” he said, was founded on the presumption that “teaching and life as a whole form one unity.”¹⁰³ Right away Jahn saw the potential of the movement in restoring the national spirit and allied his movement with fraternal organizations, sharpshooting and male choir societies, and public festivals designed as expressions of nationalistic pride, like the Hambach and Wartburg Castle festivals, which would shape the national secular liturgy that would eventually service the Third Reich.¹⁰⁴

Gymnastic movements were not isolated to Germany. Throughout Europe gymnastic organizations “preserved and extended the awareness that national consciousness is best expressed through liturgy and symbols, in festivals and their surroundings.”¹⁰⁵

Dominated by gymnastics in the early nineteenth century, Swedish physical culture was intimately associated with nationalism and military training. In an attempt to revive the strength and spirit of the ancient Nordic peoples in the wake of the humiliating loss of Finland to Russia in 1809, Per Henrik Ling, with the support of the Swedish government, established the Royal Gymnastic Central Institute in 1813. Although nearly all physical education in Sweden was at first intended to benefit military training, Ling’s principal objective for developing his own particular form of gymnastics was to resist the advance of the British modern sports movement – a dual means of serving Swedish nationalism.¹⁰⁶

Founded in 1862, the Czechoslovakian Sokol movement of Myroslav Tyrš fostered a secular Czech paramilitary nationalism that sought independence from the

¹⁰² Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 28.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 128.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 77, 83-85, 126 and 128-129.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 136.

¹⁰⁶ Bairner, *Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 145-146.

Habsburg Empire.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, “from the outset the idea of physical fitness was linked with political aims – primarily the struggle for national independence against Austro-Hungarian cultural and political repression” through “explicitly ideological and practical aims” established by Tyrs.¹⁰⁸ Like Jahn, Tyrs’ also closely linked the Sokol to festivals and symbols of nationalism¹⁰⁹ and identified his intention for the Sokol in its own journal and literature as:

which is for all classes and levels, is for the present time the physical, and in part moral education of the entire Czech nation, its upbringing to strength, courage, nobility and increased military preparedness. It must therefore see to it that in the end all the people find themselves in its ranks.¹¹⁰

One of the principal forms of uniting young Czechs, Tyrs even had Sokol members wear traditional national costumes and refer to each other as ‘brother’ and ‘sister.’¹¹¹

Russia followed the lead of the German, Czechoslovak, and Swedish gymnastic movements in that it turned to gymnastics as a way to improve national unity, self-esteem and military readiness after a military disaster – the 1855 Crimean War.¹¹² Unlike the German and Swedish forms of gymnastics, the Sokol stressed grace and decorative arrangements that, along with its panslavist overtones, attracted the attention of Russian officials.¹¹³ The first local club formed in St. Petersburg in 1863 and the Russian Gymnastics Society was established in 1883, with the backing of several reformers like Anton Chekhov, after Tsar Alexander II was persuaded that gymnastics

¹⁰⁷ Pierre Arnaud and James Riordan, ed., *Sport and International Politics* (London and New York: E & FN Spon. 1998), 4-5, 179 and 217.

¹⁰⁸ Vladimir Kostka, “Czechoslovakia,” in *Sport under Communism: the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, the G.D.R., China, Cuba*, ed. James Riordan (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 58.

¹⁰⁹ Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 136.

¹¹⁰ Claire Nolte, *The Sokol in the Czech Lands to 1914: Training for the Nation* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 62.

¹¹¹ James Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society* (Cambridge, London, Melbourne and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 47.

¹¹² Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society*, 19.

¹¹³ Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society*, 47.

could be a form of military training comprised of exercises “designed to produce a disciplined subject in peacetime and a fearless fighter in war.”¹¹⁴

In the opinion of Pyotr Lesgaft, the most impressionable advocate of Russian physical education in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the type of gymnastics implemented in Russian physical culture

would satisfy the children’s natural desire for physical movement and achievement, and also encourage such qualities as will power and initiative: ‘A person develops in the family, the family gives him affection, warmth, makes him responsive and kind; the school develops his mind, gives him the ability to form his own views, judgments and thoughts; along with an independence of thought the person’s moral values are formed. Physical exercises develop activity in a person and he acquires the ability to subordinate all his desires to his will.’¹¹⁵

Lesgaft’s adoption of the Czechoslovakian Sokol model of physical education would come to influence Soviet physical culture in years to come. Karl Marx advised that in the education system of the future “citizens were to be given...the opportunity for balanced all-round education, in which physical education was to be an integral part.”¹¹⁶ Marx’s system would encompass three components combined to train the mind *with* the body: mental education, bodily education such as provided through gymnastics or military training, and technological training.¹¹⁷ Vladimir Lenin even engaged in gymnastic activity every day while imprisoned in St. Petersburg which he claimed was essential when one is alone.¹¹⁸

Even in France by the 1880s, schoolchildren were being “taught that their first duty was to defend their country as soldiers,” and gymnastics was used to instill discipline in them while preparing them to be good soldiers and Frenchmen.¹¹⁹ “The French Revolution, then the Napoleonic Wars paved the way for associations concerned

¹¹⁴ Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society*, 19-20.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 51.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 59.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 61.

¹¹⁹ Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1976), 333.

with military fitness and training, as well as patriotic fervour.”¹²⁰ “To learn to put one’s body at the service of one’s country stems from a strategy of acculturation and nationalization of the masses in the same way as was the learning of language and national culture.”¹²¹ Indeed, European gymnastic societies of the nineteenth century “were the pedagogical and political instruments for constructing a national identity.”¹²²

b. Influential Authoritarian Regimes of the Twentieth Century

(1) Nazi Germany. When the Nazis came to power in winter of 1932, they tore up the track at the German Academy of Physical Education and Sport in Berlin planting oak trees – representative of Ludwig Jahn and the paramilitary training of the *Turnvater* gymnastic organization – on the former track. To the Nazis, the track represented foreign influence (because of modern sports movement had its origins in Britain) and the stopwatch represented pressure on athletes to compete against each other instead of together in an effort to improve the German race. Physical training intensified and success in sport was turned into a vehicle through which to display the superiority of the Aryan race and Germany to the world.¹²³

Organized into a political party in 1919, the National Socialists in Germany sought power, “the unification of all Germans in a German Empire, purification of German blood, [and] the provision of more *Lebensraum*...for the German people, particularly in the East.”¹²⁴ Non-Germanic people and their cultures had to be purged if the Aryan race was to create a superior culture and this ideology was already widespread before the Nazis assumed power and Hitler had mentioned this in *Mein Kampf*.¹²⁵ The Nazis were able to use sport to this end.

¹²⁰ Arnaud and Riordan, ed., *Sport and International Politics*, 4.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Arnd Kruger, “Strength through joy,” in *The International Politics of Sport in the 20th Century*, ed. Arnd Kruger and James Riordan (London and New York: E & FN Spon, 1999), 68-69; Arnd Kruger, “The role of sport in German international politics, 1918-1945,” in *Sport and International Politics*, ed. Pierre Arnaud and James Riordan (London and New York: E & FN Spon, 1998), 85.

¹²⁴ Kruger, “Strength through joy,” 69.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 69.

After turning to the Italian model for fascist state sport, the Nazis embraced the concept that “it was not only important that you could talk and sing about defending your fatherland, but that you were actually fit and capable to do so” – all sporting federations were to be controlled and coordinated by the state and eventually the Nazi party itself.¹²⁶ Once officially Nazi organizations, voluntary participation in sporting federations and clubs as an administrator or coach was accepted as party service – something all Germans employed in the civil service were expected to do.¹²⁷ Communist sports organizations were abolished and all sports federations were required to have Nazis as presidents who were responsible for seeing that all Jewish members were kicked out.¹²⁸

During the economic crisis after World War I, many sports educators had been released from work. Dr. Carl Krummel, Nazi party member and president of the German Organization of Physical Educators, was placed in charge of German school physical education and implemented daily physical education.¹²⁹ The new emphasis the Nazis placed on sport provided physical educators with new opportunities and prestige never known to them before. Indeed, many served as deputy directors of their schools and physical education became as important as intellectual education.¹³⁰

By the opening day of the Berlin Olympics in 1936, the Hitler Jugend had a mandate over all German youth and no youth groups were allowed to exist for 10-18 year olds that were not part of the Hitler Jugend or the Bund Deutscher Madel for boys and girls respectively. Coaches and mentors ensured the children were indoctrinated through party songs and ideology as part of physical training sessions.¹³¹

¹²⁶ Kruger, “Strength through joy,” 68; Kruger, “The role of sport in German international politics,” 86.

¹²⁷ Kruger, “Strength through joy,” 72-73;

¹²⁸ Ibid., 69-70.

¹²⁹ Kruger, “The role of sport in German international politics,” 84 and 86.

¹³⁰ Kruger, “The role of sport in German international politics,” 86; Kruger, “Strength through joy,” 74.

¹³¹ Kruger, “Strength through joy,” 71-72.

In preparation for the 1936 Berlin Olympics, Hitler and his Minister for Propaganda, Josef Goebbels decided they would stage the most grandiose Olympic games yet and win over world public opinion for the Nazi regime, and they engaged in no less than 30 international sporting events each year after 1932 partly in an effort to break the cultural isolation imposed on them by the rest of the world due to their racial atrocities.¹³² As promised, Hitler's Aryans succeeded in holding the most successful Olympic Games to that point – the Berlin Games had over three million visitors surpassing the previous record of one million in Los Angeles four years prior.¹³³

The Nazis also saw in the 1936 Games an opportunity to display their racial superiority to the world. They hired full-time coaches and allowed athletes, mostly employed by the military or a paramilitary organization, maximum time to train. Though they surprised the world by finishing first ahead of the United States and Italy, black American sprinter Jesse Owens was able to raise doubt as to the superiority of the Aryan race through his dominance in all events he participated in.¹³⁴

Germany tried to emit a sense of normalcy even after their persecution of Jews, gypsies, mentally ill, handicapped, and political dissidents became more aggressive and Hitler began World War II. However, by 1942, most international sporting competitions had ceased as it became more and more clear that the Germans would not end up winning the war. In the end, Hitler and his cronies, though not athletic themselves, had placed immense emphasis on using sport as a way through which to gain international prestige and unify the German people even referring to athletes as “soldiers in track suits, fighting for the fatherland.”¹³⁵

(2) Italian Fascism. From its inception in the 1920s, the Italian fascist regime initially viewed sport more as a physical activity before realizing its

¹³² Kruger, “The role of sport in German international politics,” 87.

¹³³ Ibid., 87-88.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 88-89.

¹³⁵ Kruger, “Strength through joy,” 76; Kruger, “The role of sport in German international politics,” 92-93.

usefulness as a political propaganda tool and promoting military skills over sporting skills within the physical education curriculum in the 1930s.

Sporting activity under fascism was regulated by the State and was a way of controlling citizens during their leisure time, in their private life and in their social relations. Controlling sport enabled the regime to study and manipulate young people and their skills. At the same time, sport was a means of promoting and spreading fascist ideology at home and abroad.¹³⁶

Benito Mussolini was an avid sportsman himself and used sport to “bring Italians together, modernize the nation, and improve the physical side of Italy in a Darwinist sense.”¹³⁷ To do this, Mussolini and his government targeted much of their attention towards the youth and made use of the mass media available at the time as “they wanted to make sure that [Italy’s] athletic success would influence everyone to become prouder of Italy, identify with the nation and the regime and become athletic themselves.”¹³⁸ The younger generation was important in order to build and perpetuate this strong nation Mussolini envisioned and the government turned to physical education to make young Italians “physically strong, well formed in their character and experienced in military skills.”¹³⁹

Shortly after Mussolini came to power in 1922, the *Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale* (MVSN – Voluntary Militia for National Security) was established in early 1923 with the purpose of conducting sports and paramilitary training for 18 to 21 year olds.¹⁴⁰ Basic physical education was considered so important that it was removed from the direction of the Ministry of Education and the influence of older civil servants who were uninterested in sport, and placed in an independent institution, the *Ente Nazionale per l’Educazion Fisica* (ENEF – National Institute for

¹³⁶ Angela Teja, “Italian sport and international relations under fascism,” in *Sport and International Politics*, ed. Pierre Arnaud and James Riordan (London and New York: E & FN Spon, 1998), 147.

¹³⁷ Kruger, “Strength through joy,” 76.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 76-77.

¹³⁹ Teja, “Italian sport and international relations under fascism,” 147.

¹⁴⁰ Kruger, “Strength through joy,” 77; Teja “Italian sport and international relations under fascism,” 147-148.

Physical Education).¹⁴¹ Subsequent to this, all students were required to be members of authorized sports clubs or they were not allowed to attend school, and physical educators were forced to retire after 20 years of service so that younger instructors were eligible to teach, being more spry and able to participate in the physical activities students were engaging in, thus setting a good example for youths to maintain more active lifestyles and improve their self-esteem.¹⁴²

During this ‘golden age of physical education’ in Italy, physical education responsibilities were passed from the ENEF to the Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB), equivalent to Germany’s Hitler Youth, for all primary and secondary school children.¹⁴³ Uniforms were required and children were organized into squadrons to prepare them for military service and expose them to fascist ideology helping the Fascist Party to create a culture of consent.¹⁴⁴

To demonstrate to the world that Italy was progressing physically and morally, thus increasing its prestige, success in international competitions was necessary. Though the commonly accepted way to create the ‘soldier-citizens’ the regime desired was through physical and military education, the use of semi-professional athletes was deemed the appropriate way with which to achieve international success and recognition.¹⁴⁵ “A gold medal in any discipline at the Olympic Games, or in the Tour de France, was more important than a thousand diplomatic acts, inasmuch as to celebrate victory meant to celebrate Italy and fascism.”¹⁴⁶ At the 1932 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, the ‘Mussolini Boys’ produced a surprising second-place finish overall – the

¹⁴¹ Kruger, “Strength through joy,” 77; Teja “Italian sport and international relations under fascism,” 148.

¹⁴² Teja, “Italian sport and international relations under fascism,” 148.

¹⁴³ Kruger, “Strength through joy,” 78; Teja, “Italian sport and international relations under fascism,” 147.

¹⁴⁴ Kruger, “Strength through joy,” 78.

¹⁴⁵ Kruger, “Strength through joy,” 79; Teja, 147.

¹⁴⁶ Teja, “Italian sport and international relations under fascism,” 156.

regimes most prolific achievement.¹⁴⁷ Italy would later win the soccer world championships in 1934 and 1938 adding to the regime's self-image of becoming a world power and racial superiority complex.¹⁴⁸

Successful athletes came to be idolized and lavished with gifts. Two awards, the Medaglie al valore atletico (medal for athletic merit) and the Stelle al merito sportive (star shape pins for sporting merit) were created in 1934 specifically for athletes, athletic federation presidents, military organizations, and organizations that operated abroad in the name of the regime with the winner of the Medaglie al valore atletico receiving free life insurance as well.¹⁴⁹ The most prized award among athletes though was recognition from the Duce himself.¹⁵⁰

The regime had used sport and physical education as a way of unifying the masses and creating a culture of consent amenable to the fascist ideology. The youth were accessed through schooling and education, and Achille Starace, the Fascist Party leader from 1932-1939, forced subordinate leaders into athletics as well. Sport was a welcome diversion from the realities of economic hardship at the time and Starace tied sporting events to parades, festivals, and party events. He even created the 'fascist Saturday' in which all work ceased at 1 p.m. so that people could attend parades and participate in athletic activities themselves.¹⁵¹

Nothing lasts forever and though the Italian soccer team had won the 1938 world championship, support for the fascists had already begun to wane. Mussolini's support of Hitler's Anschluss and subsequent declaration of war on France had essentially begun the end as the regime pursued Empire and supported ideas of racial superiority.¹⁵² World War II put an end to fascist sport, but its impact in the creation of

¹⁴⁷ Teja, "Italian sport and international relations under fascism," 157; Kruger, "Strength through joy," 79.

¹⁴⁸ Kruger, "Strength through joy," 79.

¹⁴⁹ Teja, "Italian sport and international relations under fascism," 162.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 156.

¹⁵¹ Kruger, "Strength through joy," 80.

¹⁵² Teja, "Italian sport and international relations under fascism," 166.

the fascist culture and national ideology had already occurred – so much so that the Germans turned to the Italian model when organizing their sporting system to serve the Nazi needs.

(3) The Soviet Union. From the Bolshevik seizure of power in a country on the verge of economic disintegration in 1917, Russia, the USSR has used “sport as a means of changing society; integrating sport into a gigantic effort to take a backward and poor country of vast size from near-feudalism to modernity” in a short period of time in relation to its European neighbors.¹⁵³ Lenin himself was certain that sport played a tremendous role in the creation of a “harmonious communist man” and was adamant that a High School for Sports and Physical Culture be built early as 1917.¹⁵⁴ Indeed, the Soviets were in many ways pioneers in sports policy. They were the first to link sport directly to public health policy, organizing athletic activities for different age and ability groups, implementing the idea that communities should own and build their own stadiums, and requiring multi-sport clubs to support minor sports through the success of their more popular sports.¹⁵⁵

In the history of international sporting competition, the Soviet Union has been the most successful nation to date winning, through medal count, every Olympic Games it has competed in with the exception of the 1968 Summer Games and the 1980 Winter Games. Moreover, they have shown their versatility by taking part in every Olympic event as of the 1980 Olympics.¹⁵⁶ In doing this, Soviet sport also reinforces Marxist ideology of “the interdependence of the physical and mental states of human beings, so that physical culture is treated equally with mental culture in a person’s upbringing” – this benefits the individual as well as society.¹⁵⁷ This is done through state

¹⁵³ Don Anthony, introduction to *Sport under Communism: the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, the G.D.R., China, Cuba*, ed. James Riordan (London and Montreal: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 5; James Riordan, “The U.S.S.R.,” in *Sport under Communism: the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, the G.D.R., China, Cuba*, ed. James Riordan (London and Montreal: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 16-17.

¹⁵⁴ Anthony, introduction to *Sport under Communism*, 6.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 6-7.

¹⁵⁶ Riordan, “The U.S.S.R.,” 15.

¹⁵⁷ Riordan, “The U.S.S.R.,” 15; Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society*, 59.

provisions making sport available to as many people as possible and combining it with an educational aspect designed to change society for the better.

During the War Communism period following the Revolution, sport and physical education were intended to support the war effort and in May 1918 the Central Board of Universal Military Training, the *Vsevobuch*, was established “to supply the Red Army with contingents of trained conscripts as quickly as possible.”¹⁵⁸ Responsible for the physical training of all people ages 16-40, the *Vsevobuch* coordinated its efforts with the Commissariates of Education and Health thereby combining military training with political and hygienic education – a necessary partnership in the eyes of Nikolai Podvoisky, head of the *Vsevobuch*, in order to effectively conclude the Civil War and create a successful socialist state.¹⁵⁹

The Revolution and capitalist threats required fit and healthy recruits to ensure the country’s survival and subsequent industrial development, and participation in daily exercises was required. This not only served to improve the health standards quickly, but it also was a means through which the state could implement an education program focused on exercise, hygiene and nutrition – and with the tremendous migration of peasants into the urban areas, higher levels of hygiene were a necessity lest the socialist movement experience some sort of setback via viral outbreak or the like.¹⁶⁰

Podvoisky believed that the “emotional attraction of *competitive* sport” was essential for the people to buy into the promotion of health and hygiene being pushed by the state – this at a time when many socialist educators regarded competitive sport as bourgeois and counter to socialist ideology, Pyotr Lesgaft for instance.¹⁶¹ Regardless, competitions were sanctioned partly because sport was seen by the state as a means with which to integrate the different peoples from the previous Russian Empire. For example, the First Central Asian Olympics in 1920 saw Uzbeks, Kazahks, Kirgiz, Turkmenians and Russians competing together in the same athletic event:

¹⁵⁸ Riordan, “The U.S.S.R.,” 17; Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society*, 37-38.

¹⁵⁹ Riordan, “The U.S.S.R.,” 17-18.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

The integrative functions of sport are great. This has immense importance for our multinational state. Sports contests, festivals, spartakiads and other types of sporting competition have played an important part in cementing the friendship of Soviet peoples.¹⁶²

After the conclusion of the Civil War, the Communist Party set a more formal direction for sport and physical culture declaring:

Sport was to be a means for achieving (a) better health and physical fitness; (b) character-formation, as part of general education in producing a harmonious personality; (c) military training; and (d) the identification of individuals with groups (Party, Soviet, trade-union) and their encouragement to be active socially and politically.¹⁶³

Sporting achievement was viewed as a motivation to others to raise personal standards and participate. The Party also knew that if they were going to compete in international events, they needed a large pool from which to pull the best representatives who could prove the superiority of their socialist system.¹⁶⁴

Once the economy began to improve in the mid to latter 1920s, the first Five Year Plan was set in motion in late 1928. This is the context in which the model for Soviet sport as is known today was created.¹⁶⁵ First, the All-Union Physical Culture Council was established in April 1930 to “decide all issues concerning the organization of sport.”¹⁶⁶ Next, the Party transferred all sporting clubs to local workplaces, thus organizing them on a “production basis” with people belonging to a specific factory or office or school, and being eligible for membership in the sports “collective” at their workplace. The Party now had an organized hierarchy at workplaces and schools through which to control sport, bringing it in line organizationally with other state-run institutions.¹⁶⁷ To maintain interest and foster development of more proficient athletes, the Party implemented specific trade-union sports societies in 1935 that workers

¹⁶² Riordan, “The U.S.S.R.,” 18-19.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 21.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 23; Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society*, 93.

¹⁶⁶ Riordan, “The U.S.S.R.,” 23.

¹⁶⁷ Riordan, “The U.S.S.R.,” 23.

could join on a voluntary basis which were similar to the security services' Dinamo Society, Lokomotiv for railway workers for example.¹⁶⁸ These societies engaged in inter-society competitions fostering heightened interest and mass appeal to spectators, eventually leading to the creation of state-wide sporting leagues and championship competitions.¹⁶⁹

Government acknowledgement of the significance of competitive sport was evident in the awarding of the Order of Lenin, the country's highest form of recognition, to the Dinamo and Spartak sports societies in the summer of 1937. The *Gotov k trudu I oborone* (GTO) program was also initiated in the 1930s with the intent to "extend the scope of sports participation, give everyone something to aim for and start to make regular participation in sport a normal feature of the socialist way of life" and to "establish a mass base from which potential stars could be drawn" for international competition.¹⁷⁰

Competitive sport in the Soviet Union in the 1930s was a welcome diversion from the daily grind of their everyday lives and it cultivated unity among workers. Sport had served to improve the fitness of the people and increase hygienic awareness within a society undergoing a rural-to-urban transformation. The Party was also keen to capitalize on the appeal of sport and link it to festivals and political celebrations designed to stir up patriotism among the people and 'remind' them what a great life they had under socialism. Through all this, the sporting establishment reacquainted itself with the military in providing forms of military training for potential recruits as the Soviet Union was surrounded by hostile neighbors and rising fascist regimes to the West – after 1931, the primary purpose of the GTO was to train people for work and military readiness through sport.¹⁷¹

The Nazis drove deep into the Soviet Union during World War II reaching the outskirts of Moscow and Leningrad before being driven out and

¹⁶⁸ I Riordan, "The U.S.S.R.," 23-24.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 24.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 24-25.

¹⁷¹ Riordan, "The U.S.S.R.," 25 and 27.

surrendering in the summer of 1945. Officially, over 20 million citizens of the Soviet Union lost their lives and material damage was staggering.¹⁷² Nevertheless, domestic sporting events were still held mostly as a way to enhance morale in the war-torn nation. Indeed, a soccer match between two garrison teams took place in Leningrad on 6 May 1942 despite shell explosions near the stadium.¹⁷³

As in much of Europe, sporting events did dramatically decline though and the GTO was reoriented to provide only military training in such areas as first-aid, bayonet drill, rifle handling, topography, and grenade tossing. Additionally, the war resulted in the loss of many of the Soviet Unions most proficient and beloved athletes such as Babarykin the marathon champion, Kaplinsky the Soviet speed skating record holder, and woman ski champion Lyubov Kulakova who was captured and executed by the Nazis after operating as a partisan behind enemy lines for several months. In fact, athletes were often given dangerous missions because of their assumed superior skill, stamina and strength.¹⁷⁴

The war did have several consequences regarding sport and physical culture. It convinced authorities that their emphasis on functionalizing sport across the country was correct. It bolstered their belief that sport and physical education should contain a military bias. The Party took advantage of the emotional effect of the war and held sports festivals named for athletes killed in battle in order to generate a “national grief” by evoking their memories. Winning the war also instilled pride in the Soviet peoples and lent credence to the legitimacy of all their sacrifice and hard work prior to the war. Many Soviet citizens also felt they had taken on the lion’s share of responsibility in the defeat of the Nazis – patriotic feelings that would resurface in the Soviet drive to dominate their adversaries in future international sporting events during the Cold War era.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷² Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society*, 153.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 156.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 157-158.

¹⁷⁵ Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society*, 154 and 159-160; Riordan, “The U.S.S.R.,” 28.

With the end of the war, Party officials became more and more interested in the potential political uses of sport, decreeing in 1948 that “sport should strive not simply for equality with other nations but for Soviet dominance.”¹⁷⁶ The Party soon realized that the Soviet Union would have to join existing international federations if it was to achieve its goal of displaying supremacy through international sporting success. The Soviet Olympic Committee was created in October 1951 and the Soviet Union made its first Olympic appearance in Helsinki in 1952.¹⁷⁷ Additionally, they would have to abide by the rules requiring the use of amateur athletes in most of the international bodies. Soviet athletes of the most proficient caliber would subsequently take up one of three common occupations: student, serviceman or physical education instructor, each under the cognizance of a sports society or trade-union.¹⁷⁸ Athletes in these “professions” were allotted ample time to train as they had no real occupational responsibilities to speak of leading to their being labeled “shamateurs” by the West. In actuality, the Soviet system still required their athletes to devote quite a bit of time to academic pursuits in order to prepare them for life after their short career as athletes.¹⁷⁹

Throughout the Cold War era, the Soviet Union implemented a schooling system that emphasized the role of sport and physical fitness alongside academic achievement. As a matter of fact, the first two years of schooling required every student to attend physical education classes. If the student did not attend these classes, or perform satisfactorily during their examinations, they could be prevented from continuing their studies regardless of any advanced academic performance or potential.¹⁸⁰ The Soviets quickly realized that early specialization in sport was necessary to achieve the elevated standards required for international success, therefore advanced schools and boarding schools with enhanced athletic curriculums were available at the

¹⁷⁶ Robert Edelman, “Stalin & His Soccer Soldiers,” *History Today* 43 (February 1993): 207.

¹⁷⁷ Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society*, 162; Riordan, “The U.S.S.R.,” 29.

¹⁷⁸ Riordan, “The U.S.S.R.,” 29-30.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 30 and 46-47; Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society*, 162-164.

¹⁸⁰ Riordan, “The U.S.S.R.,” 38-43.

recommendation of a coach, or at the parents' request – stringent entrance exams and medical tests were required prior to entry though.¹⁸¹

In the development of the Soviet society, emphasis on sport and physical culture was always present, though the focus sometimes altered between providing functional services such as military or industrial training to serving political goals by achieving international success in athletic competition, particularly at Olympiads. It is within the latter context that the case studies for this thesis took place.

4. Sport and Politics

Modern sport has its origins in early nineteenth century Britain where, in 1811, Cambridge University's Regius Professor of Modern History stated that Britain's very survival derived from, among other things, "hardy sports, from manly schools."¹⁸² The British model of incorporating sport, physical activities and toughness into the education system of their young men inspired individuals from the European continent, such as Baron de Coubertin and Ludwig Jahn, to implement sport and physical education into their own societies and culture for much the same purposes – to strengthen, culturally and physically, their younger generations for the sake of their nations.¹⁸³ Initially often taking the form of the gymnastic movements previously mentioned and being tied closely to the industrialization and urbanization of the population, the state was not wholly concerned with the movements themselves and was usually happy to subsidize them leaving the clubs and organizations themselves in charge.¹⁸⁴

However, by the time the twentieth century rolled around, government officials had come to recognize the political potential for organized and competitive sport. The period between the two World Wars saw a spike in the internationalization of sport and it

¹⁸¹ Riordan, "The U.S.S.R.," 43-46.

¹⁸² Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 170.

¹⁸³ Pierre Arnaud, "Sport and international relations before 1918," in *Sport and International Politics*, ed. Pierre Arnaud and James Riordan (London and New York: E & FN Spon, 1998), 14; Hugill, "Olympics Old and New," 27; Kruger, "The unfinished symphony," 3; Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 38.

¹⁸⁴ Arnaud, "Sport and international relations before 1918," 27.

increasingly took on more and more political significance peaking during the Cold War era.¹⁸⁵ How is this? How can sport be a tool of politics? A portion of the answer lies here in these examples:

Initiating or Improving Diplomatic Relations. The visit of the U. S. ping-pong team to China in 1971 lent to the “ensuing rapprochement” and eventual restoration of diplomatic relations between those two countries.¹⁸⁶

Spread Ideology and Propaganda. The Soviet Union charged its sports organizations “to ensure top performance by Soviet athletes abroad as a means of widely publicizing our attainments in building communism and in promoting physical culture and sport and to gain a prominent position internationally in the major sports.”¹⁸⁷

Generate Publicity and Revenue. It should go without saying how much media hype is stirred up every time the International Olympic Committee engages competing cities and nations in bidding wars over the responsibility for hosting an Olympic Games. A large cause for this is that an event such as this holds a significant amount of potential long-term economic and social benefits for the host community through the sport-media-tourism complex. So much is at stake that communities are willing to lie – or at least exaggerate a great deal – in order to win hosting rights and lure tourists from around the world. Take, for instance, Salt Lake City’s drastic misrepresentation of the role of the Mormon religion in the history of the city, and Utah itself, in its bid to host the 2002 Winter Olympics – all at the expense of the non-Mormon majority there.¹⁸⁸

Increase Prestige. Victory in international sporting events is often portrayed as confirming some sort of superiority over another nation, while defeat induces shame.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁵ Pierre Arnaud, “Sport – a means of national representation,” in *Sport and International Politics*, ed. Pierre Arnaud and James Riordan (London and New York: E & FN Spon, 1998), 3-5; Kruger and Riordan, ed., *The International Politics of Sport in the 20th Century*, ix-x.

¹⁸⁶ Nafziger, “International Sports Law,” 496-497.

¹⁸⁷ Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society*, 349.

¹⁸⁸ John Nauright, “Global games: culture, political economy and sport in the globalised world of the 21st century,” *Third World Quarterly* 25:7 (2004): 1326 and 1328.

¹⁸⁹ Robert J. Paddick, “Sport and Politics: the (Gross) Anatomy of their Relationships,” *The Journal of the Australian Society for Sports History* 1:2 (May 1984): 58.

‘Second place sucks.’ ‘He who places second is the leader among losers.’ ‘Second place is like tongue-kissing your sister.’ Everyone who has ever participated in athletics – at least in North America – has heard these phrases...if they lost. Winners are applauded.

Means of Protest and Reprisal. A very common form of protest through sport is the boycott. Often, but not always, associated with the Olympic Games, boycotting an international sporting event of for non-athletic reasons reduces the validity of the victor because all worthy competitors did not participate.¹⁹⁰ The U. S. boycotted the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympic Games in protest to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to which the Soviet Union responded with their own boycott of the 1984 Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles.¹⁹¹ The ultimate objective here is to generate enough pressure on public opinion in order to force a change in the foreign policy of another state.¹⁹²

Political Education. The Soviet Union was keen to utilize sport as a means through which to propagate socialist ideology. Members of the Komsomols, organizations for eighteen to twenty-five year olds within the Young Communist League are directed to “conduct political educational work among sportsmen and members of the physical culture groups.”¹⁹³

Develop National Consciousness. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy are prime examples, previously discussed, of a state’s manipulation of sport and physical culture to foster a sense of national identity, pride and racial superiority among their citizens.

Unification. In countries where peoples of multiple cultures and ethnicities reside, sport can serve to bring them together. At the 1995 Rugby World Cup in Cape Town, South Africa, President Nelson Mandela visited the team that had long represented the racial tensions in the country. Addressing “his boys”, he told them, “you will help

¹⁹⁰ Robert J. Paddick, “Sport and Politics: the (Gross) Anatomy of their Relationships,” *The Journal of the Australian Society for Sports History* 1:2 (May 1984): 57.

¹⁹¹ Hill, *Olympic Politics*, 118.

¹⁹² Arnaud, “Sport – a means of national representation,” 11.

¹⁹³ Howell, “The USSR,” 141.

bind our country into a single unit...I used to wish the Springboks to lose. Not any more, oh no...You fellows now represent our whole country.”¹⁹⁴

Gain Favor. Specifically in the eyes of another state or within the international community by displaying solidarity with them either by excluding athletes from an out-of-favor state from participating in sporting events within the home state or boycotting participation in another state hosting a competition in order to come in line with the position of a favored state. In 1919, a French soccer team refused a match with a Swiss team that had previously played against a German team, in order to appeal to their British comrades’ political position.¹⁹⁵

Prove Superiority. Athletes represent states and nations. When they win, it is symbolic of the nation or state winning. At the 1900 Olympic Games, the U. S. athletes fared much better than their European counterparts – “Such superiority of human resources demonstrated that America was the society of the future.”¹⁹⁶

The early twentieth century witnessed the transformation of sport and physical culture from being merely a political tool, to becoming a political tool of the state. Subsequently, the Cold War era holds answers to the question of how international sporting competitions can transcend the ice rinks and provide a stage for political grievance and conflict not only between the capitalist West and communist East, but within the socialist world itself. Moreover, it provides an example of a perceived national identity being defined by a sport, as well as an example of the possibility of a single sporting event providing the bedrock for a nation-state’s foreign relations policy.

In sequence, these examples are provide in the following text beginning with the mutinous actions taken by the Czechoslovak peoples in response to two ice hockey matches in early 1969 just before Dubcek’s removal from power. Following this is an account of the increasing Canadian anxiety exhibited between 1954 and 1972 as they saw

¹⁹⁴ Grant Jarvie and Irene Reid, “Sport in South Africa,” in *The International Politics of Sport in the 20th Century*, ed. Arnd Kruger and James Riordan (London and New York: E & FN Spon, 1999), 244.

¹⁹⁵ Arnaud, “Sport – a means of national representation,” 11.

¹⁹⁶ David B. Kanin, “Superpower Sport in Cold War and Détente,” in *Sport and International Relations*, ed. Benjamin Lowe, David Kanin, and Andrew Strenk (Champaign, IL: Stipes, 1978), 250.

the Soviet Union threaten their national identity through success in international ice hockey competition. Lastly is a rendition of the spectacular achievements of the 1980 U. S. men's ice hockey team who not only lifted the spirits of the American nation, but quite possibly directly jump-started American politics and foreign policy.

III. “4-3! 4-3!”: 1969 WORLD CHAMPIONSHIP OF ICE HOCKEY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA VS. THE SOVIET UNION

A. HISTORICAL SETTING: THE SOVIET HEGEMON

Upon the conclusion of World War II, the world lurched into a Cold War that saw the global superpowers assume hegemonic status within each of their respective spheres of influence.¹⁹⁷ The United States represented capitalism and liberal democracy in the West, and the Soviet Union represented socialism and state-regulated communism in the East. The security and preservation of the Western world and democracy were guaranteed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), created in 1949.¹⁹⁸ The East countered with the establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 which was intended to preserve socialist gains in an organization dominated by the Soviet Union¹⁹⁹ – largely through so-called socialist solidarity and Stalinist intimidation.

The Czechoslovak Republic, a nation state formed of Czechs and Slovaks after World War I,²⁰⁰ and reformed after the end of the Second World War, was a satellite of the Soviet Union that bordered the West – the Federal Republic of Germany and neutral Austria. It was also a significant power in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance’s (Comecon) Comprehensive Programme for Integration designed to incorporate a joint rail system, shared electricity grids, and a network of oil and gas pipelines into a type of economic union within the U.S.S.R.²⁰¹ These two facts alone were enough for the U.S.S.R. to place a great deal of interest in Czechoslovakia throughout the entire Cold War era.

¹⁹⁷ The dates are somewhat debatable, but I have chosen to stick with the dates as set forth in a Cold War service certificate from the United States Department of Defense, DD Form 2774 dated 1 July 2001.

¹⁹⁸ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed* (Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), xvii.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 31.

²⁰⁰ Jaroslav Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris & Company, 1990), xi.

²⁰¹ Karen Dawisha, “Soviet Security and the Role of the Military: The 1968 Czechoslovak Crisis,” *British Journal of Political Science* 10:3 (July 1980): 343.

B. THE PRAGUE SPRING AND THE SOVIET INVASION

During the Second World War and the period immediately following it, Czechoslovakia saw itself pinched in between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia – two expansionist powers whose political and social ideologies were foreign to those of more Western European influence the Czechoslovak people were more accustomed to. Indeed, Czech people have a history closely linked to Western Europe. In 1420, Hussite Czechs openly challenged the Roman Catholic Church, and it can be argued that the revolt of the Protestant Bohemians against their Catholic king in 1618 sparked the Thirty Years War in Europe.²⁰² The Slovaks, by contrast, had been a part of the Kingdom of Hungary, and their road to nationhood in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries followed a different path, as did their brief interlude as an Axis satellite distinguish them from the Bohemians and Moravians to the West.²⁰³

Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia in March, 1948, but the bulk of Czech and Slovak peoples never fully bought into the Marxist-Leninist ideology the communists sought to impose on them.²⁰⁴ In the wake of the liberalizing trend that unfolded in the 1960s, central Europe began to ferment along with the general process of same visible in the middle 1860s.²⁰⁵ In particular, in the wake of the disappearance of Khrushchev in 1964, popular discontent grew and a champion of reform came to power in January 1968 in the form of the Slovak Alexander Dubcek.²⁰⁶ The ensuing period of liberalization in Czechoslovakia from January 1968 to August 1968 was known as the ‘Prague Spring.’²⁰⁷

²⁰² Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, ix.

²⁰³ Schulze, *States, Nations and Nationalism*, 292; Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 146; Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, 206-207; Ivan T. Berend, *History Derailed: Central and Eastern Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley, London, and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 111-114.

²⁰⁴ Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, x-xi.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 3 and 114-117.

²⁰⁶ Kenneth N. Skoug, Jr., *Czechoslovakia's Lost Fight for Freedom, 1967-1969: an American Embassy Perspective* (London and Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 55-56.

²⁰⁷ Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, 189-191.

The intention of the reformers basically amounted to a liberalization of their Leninist regime. Reformers sought the integration of new institutions and values, and social equilibrium into existing institutions by gradually increasing “the space where people can feel themselves more or less free.”²⁰⁸ Make no mistake, Dubcek and other reformers did not seek a clean break from the Soviet model, but they had realized that communist rule had failed to create the society they desired and they were out to create an unconventional pro-Soviet socialist system with democratic aspects that considered unique Czechoslovak traditions and history.²⁰⁹

Williams claims that Czechoslovak reformers proceeded without fear of retribution from the Soviet hegemon for four reasons. First, they believed they had Moscow’s unofficial approval as a newly rejuvenated Czechoslovakia would serve to improve the entire Soviet commonwealth. Second, reformers believed that changes implemented by Khrushchev had taken hold within the Party and endured even after his ‘retirement.’ Third, Czechoslovak officials believed they possessed more freedom than they did because no Soviet troops had been stationed there, thus providing evidence of Czechoslovakia’s possession of a place of ‘favor’ within the realm of Soviet influence. Lastly, reformers believed they could “cross-breed a delicate hybrid” of political, social, and economic systems that would be protected from Western capitalist competition in a “Soviet greenhouse” under Moscow’s influence.²¹⁰ Dubcek and his fellow reformers sought to marry socialism and democracy in order to create a “more humane order” the likes of which the world had not seen.²¹¹

Even though Dubcek had spent a great portion of his life residing in the Soviet Union and was selected to attend the Higher Political School of the Soviet Communist Party as a promising party official in 1955,²¹² the Soviets were still suspicious of him and the liberalization in progress. After all, such attempts as to shake off the mantle of Soviet

²⁰⁸ Kieran Williams, *The Prague Spring and its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics 1968-1970* (Cambridge, Melbourne and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 10-13.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 10-11.

²¹¹ Ibid., 13.

²¹² Skoug, *Czechoslovakia’s Lost Fight for Freedom*, 62.

leadership as had been the case in East Germany, Hungary and Poland in the period 1953-1956 had ended in Soviet armor re-establishing the socialist fraternity of arms at the point of a gun.²¹³ The rise of flower power in the West and the cultural revolution in Mao's China added additional forces of change in 1968, but the USSR surely was unwilling to relinquish its imperial base of power in the heart of Europe at a time when the US was bogged down in Vietnam.

To make matters worse for the Soviets, the Czechoslovak national ice hockey team defeated the Soviet Union's team – undefeated to that point – 5 to 4 at the Grenoble Winter Olympics in France on February 15, 1968.²¹⁴ The Soviets perceived the subsequent Czechoslovak celebrations, which saw thousands of people crowd the streets in euphoria, as being the manifestation of anti-Soviet sentiment which had previously been displayed at other hockey matches.²¹⁵ After several months of increasing civil liberties in the face of growing Soviet concern, the Soviet Union had had enough and military forces from five Warsaw Pact countries invaded late in the evening of August 20, 1968.²¹⁶

There are several theories as to why the Warsaw Pact invaded in the summer of 1968. For sure, the Soviet leadership had concerns over the diminishment of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's (KPC) leading role and tight control over the security forces, mass media, and decision-making process. The Soviets were also perturbed with the frequency of changes in government personnel without their consent.²¹⁷ As well, there were the strategic concerns previously mentioned regarding the geographic location

²¹³ Robert Higham and Frederick W. Kagan, *The Military History of the Soviet Union* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 229-231; Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, 195-196.

²¹⁴ Tad Szulc, *Czechoslovakia Since World War II* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1972), 274-275; Hockey CCCP International, "Games," Hockey CCCP International, <http://www.chidlovski.com/personal/1954/00games.htm> (accessed May 30, 2008).

²¹⁵ Szulc, *Czechoslovakia Since World War II*, 274-275.

²¹⁶ The Warsaw Pact countries that participated in the invasion are the U.S.S.R., Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria. Krejci, *Czechoslovakia Since World War II*, 189-190; Skoug, *Czechoslovakia's Lost Fight for Freedom*, 135. Initial estimates of the total number of forces were around 200 thousand troops. Later estimates by the Czechoslovak Minister of Defense indicate approximately 650 thousand troops and seven thousand tanks were involved in the invasion. Skoug, 140.

²¹⁷ Dawisha, "Soviet Security and the Role of the Military," 342-343.

of Czechoslovakia bordering the West and its importance to Comecon in addition to the Czechoslovak role as a major arms and uranium supplier to the Soviet Union.²¹⁸ Furthermore, the Soviets feared the further liberalization of Czechoslovakia would lead to that state's withdrawal from the Soviet sphere of influence, neutrality or alignment with the West and NATO, and disintegration of the power balance in central Europe as the reform process would spill over into neighboring socialist states in a sort of domino-effect.²¹⁹ The defection of Czechoslovakia would have made the Soviet position in the German Democratic Republic less tenable as well.

Regardless of the speculation, the Soviet's official reason for invading was "to secure the socialist system in Czechoslovakia and to ensure the security of the whole socialist community."²²⁰ This was articulated in the Brezhnev Doctrine in September 1968 as an attempt to justify Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia – and previously in East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956 – with an official stance that the Soviet Union would resort to military intervention if necessary to protect socialist governments in central and Eastern Europe.²²¹

C. MORE THAN A MIRACLE ON ICE: NATIONAL REDEMPTION

Within six hours of the invasion, Czechoslovak radio began to broadcast information about the invasion and became the bedrock of the Czechoslovak resistance. This was vital to the legitimacy of the invasion as the radio broadcasts quickly made it clear that there had been no 'invitation' from government officials seeking Soviet intervention.²²² Warsaw Pact tanks and armored vehicles had made their way into Prague to find angry citizens surprised at the turn of events who were ridiculing the

²¹⁸ Dawisha, "Soviet Security and the Role of the Military," 343.

²¹⁹ Williams, *The Prague Spring and its Aftermath*, 29; Dawisha, "Soviet Security and the Role of the Military," 343.

²²⁰ Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, 190.

²²¹ Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, 190 and 195-196; Harold S. Russell, "The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?" *The American Journal of International Law* 70:2 (April 1976): 253-254.

²²² Skoug, *Czechoslovakia's Lost Fight for Freedom*, 142-144.

Warsaw Pact troops about their supposed ‘invitation’ to their country. Incensed, one woman was even known to have commented that the Germans had been better at it when they did it in 1939.²²³

Throughout the entire country radio stations, television stations, and the print media continued to report as much as they could for as long as they could, provoking the people not to give in and a solid week of non-violent resistance ensued – Czechoslovak solidarity had never been higher.²²⁴ On August 23, thousands of Czechoslovaks filled Wenceslas Square in Prague waving flags and singing the national anthem, but the faces of the people showed a real sadness to go along with their defiance and the invaders were mostly ignored at this point.²²⁵ Several of their reform leaders had been kidnapped and others had gone to Moscow to ‘negotiate’ an end to the occupation.²²⁶ On August 27, the delegation returned from Moscow after having signed an agreement that essentially ended the Prague Spring.²²⁷

Though the invasion forces withdrew to other locations, they remained in the country.²²⁸ A period of malaise set in as all the reforms of the Prague Spring gradually were revoked.²²⁹ The ‘normalization’ process had begun. Normalization was the process of returning things to the way they were, forcing the adaptation of something to conform to an accepted norm. It was the “restoration of communist control” and “the return to the ‘normal’ Soviet-type system” with the “re-calibration of the local system to match the norm represented by the Soviet model.”²³⁰ Essentially, the Czechoslovaks were going to lose any gains they had made during the Prague Spring while the Soviet system of government was reestablished.

²²³ Skoug, *Czechoslovakia’s Lost Fight for Freedom*, 142.

²²⁴ Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, 190; Williams *The Prague Spring and its Aftermath*, 42.

²²⁵ Skoug, *Czechoslovakia’s Lost Fight for Freedom*, 151.

²²⁶ Ibid., 151 and 159-162.

²²⁷ Ibid., 177.

²²⁸ Ibid., 180.

²²⁹ Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, 190-191.

²³⁰ Williams, *The Prague Spring and its Aftermath*, 39-40.

Three recent surrenders – Germany in 1938, the communist takeover in 1948, and the 1968 invasion by Warsaw Pact forces – and the feeling of betrayal by their previously reformist leaders brought a great sense of despair and shame to the people.²³¹ Though Czechoslovak leaders saw their capitulation to Soviet intimidation as accepting the lesser of two evils – the other being a military occupation by the Soviets – in order to assure such things to their people as a reasonable standard of living, employment, and adequate public goods, the Czechoslovak people still felt disillusioned and let down by those who they had placed so much trust in.²³²

By January 1969, Czechoslovakia had become a federated state and reformist leaders were slowly losing power to pro-Soviet leaders.²³³ National desperation plummeted further. The situation was perceived as being so bad that, beginning with Jan Palach on January 8, 1969, several Czechoslovaks engaged in self-immolation in direct protest to the loss of freedoms in Czechoslovakia.²³⁴ The rash of suicides stunned the country and renewed the Czechoslovak sense of defiance. The media became more active and playwright Vaclav Havel made a public scandal out of a police microphone he found in his home.²³⁵ Soviet officials were becoming impatient with the situation in Czechoslovakia and were looking for something to exploit through which they could take more aggressive action. The opportunity would present itself in March.

In September 1968, Czechoslovak officials made the announcement that they felt the country would be unable to host the 1969 World Ice Hockey Championships previously scheduled to be held in Prague, citing concern for the behavior of the crowd during games pitting the Soviet team against the Czechoslovak team. The tournament was subsequently relocated to Stockholm, Sweden.²³⁶ On March 21, 1969, the Czechoslovak national team squared off against the team from the Soviet Union. Nearly

²³¹ Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, 191-192.

²³² Williams, *The Prague Spring and its Aftermath*, 42 and 46-47.

²³³ Szulc, *Czechoslovakia Since World War II*, 472-473; Williams, *The Prague Spring and its Aftermath*, 183-188.

²³⁴ Skoug, *Czechoslovakia's Lost Fight for Freedom*, 218-220.

²³⁵ Szulc, *Czechoslovakia Since World War II*, 473.

²³⁶ Skoug, *Czechoslovakia's Lost Fight for Freedom*, 227.

every radio and television set in Czechoslovakia was tuned in to the broadcast of the game in which the Czechoslovaks surprisingly defeated the Soviets in a 2-0 shutout. The eight thousand spectators at the game broke into cheers waving Czechoslovak flags and taunted the Soviet players demonstrating their support of the plight of the Czechoslovak peoples while crowds of people flooded into Wenceslas Square in jubilation only to be subjugated to police intimidation and arrest.²³⁷ One published comment about the game stated, “No tanks were there so they lost.”²³⁸

One week later, the two teams met again on March 28 in the second round of play. Just prior to the game, the Czechoslovak team refused to engage in the traditional handshake with their opponents.²³⁹ Millions of Czechoslovaks again tuned in to the radio and television broadcasts as *their* team played with an intensity that only nationalistic fervor can instill.²⁴⁰ The Czechoslovak determination once again prevailed and their team beat the Soviet team for the second time in two weeks, this time 4-3.²⁴¹

D. LEGACY

Immediately following the victory, approximately five hundred thousand Czechs and Slovaks poured into the streets over sixty-nine towns and cities in triumph and a state of euphoria.²⁴² The people poured into Wenceslas Square and draped the statue of Saint Wenceslas with Czechoslovak flags in celebration of the defeat over their oppressors.²⁴³ The rallying cry of the evening became “four to three”²⁴⁴ as people gathered around Soviet garrisons and police stations to taunt their invaders and offer defiance to those

²³⁷ Skoug, *Czechoslovakia's Lost Fight for Freedom*, 227-228.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, 228.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁰ Szulc, *Czechoslovakia Since World War II*, 473; Skoug, *Czechoslovakia's Lost Fight for Freedom*, 228.

²⁴¹ Skoug, *Czechoslovakia's Lost Fight for Freedom*, 228.

²⁴² Williams, 198-199.

²⁴³ Szulc, *Czechoslovakia Since World War II*, 473-474.

²⁴⁴ Skoug, *Czechoslovakia's Lost Fight for Freedom*, 228.

‘brothers’ they perceived to have stabbed them in the back.²⁴⁵ Kenneth Skoug, an American eyewitness to the events in Prague stated:

For a small, humiliated nation, deprived of the last vestige of free expression by the leadership that had abandoned itself to mere survival, it was the moment of truth. The night air throbbed with the sound of national redemption. I had never seen Czechs so happy...It was as if their self-respect had been recaptured on that rink in Sweden.²⁴⁶

Peaceful celebration did not last long however as the demonstrations rapidly escalated into violent anti-Soviet protests. Throughout the country, Soviet garrisons and vehicles were attacked, and roughly sixty-five Czechoslovak policemen were injured as well.²⁴⁷ The *Aeroflot* office, the Soviet national airline, was even ransacked.²⁴⁸

There is speculation that the vandalism that took place at the *Aeroflot* office was incited by the StB, the Czechoslovak security service. Though a crowd over several thousand eventually gathered in the area demonstrating, nothing else had been damaged.²⁴⁹ Moreover, in his memoirs, Dubcek made comment about a group of StB agents, dressed as city workers, unloaded a pile of large stones conveniently in front of the *Aeroflot* office – all supervised by the Minister of Interior for the Czech lands, Josef Groesser whom Dubcek claimed was a Soviet agent. Dubcek claims this had been coordinated in advance with the KGB in order to take advantage of a just such a situation as the celebratory demonstrations “so as to provide a pretext for crushing the ‘anti-Soviet forces’” in Czechoslovakia.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁵ Williams, *The Prague Spring and its Aftermath*, 199.

²⁴⁶ Skoug, *Czechoslovakia’s Lost Fight for Freedom*, 229.

²⁴⁷ Szulc, 474.

²⁴⁸ Kenneth Skoug was an eyewitness to this event. He claims he saw “burly men, none of whom looked the least bit like students” methodically throwing large stones through the windows - the catalyst for the gathering of a large crowd. He also thought it odd that police took a very long time to arrive on the scene and were very casual and nonchalant once they did. Skoug, *Czechoslovakia’s Lost Fight for Freedom*, 229.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

When asked by Soviet officials to have the crowds dispersed by force, Dubcek refused, further infuriating the Soviets.²⁵¹ Over time, Soviet pressure intensified and subsequently police measures were intensified and censorship was increased.²⁵² It was not long before the Soviets had ousted Dubcek. He was replaced by the Moscow-approved Gustav Husak on April 17, 1969, who would “reintroduce the Stalinist theory and practice of party dictatorship” to the Czechoslovak peoples.²⁵³ Husak, in his first 120 days in power, “imposed the strictest censorship of the mass media ever known in Czechoslovakia, dismissed hundreds of journalists arbitrarily, banned the most newspapers and magazines since 1951, made the greatest purge in the party since 1951, and permitted, under emergency laws, the security forces to victimize everyone at anytime.”²⁵⁴

The Czechoslovakian case is a perfect example of nation rallying behind one of their sporting teams in a display of national pride and collective identity. Though the resulting demonstrations and riots from the game on March 28, 1969 were used as a pretext for the Soviet leadership to replace a reformist leader with one clearly of their same fabric, the victories achieved on the ice gave a demoralized Czechoslovak people something to be proud of. Victory on the ice made up for their perceived military defeat during the invasion in 1968. The hockey victories would fuel the continued resistance of the Czechoslovaks and give them something positive to hang on to until a new light emerged at the end of 1989 with the arrival of the Velvet Revolution which would ultimately lead to the independence of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic in 1993.

The memory of the Prague Spring and the hockey victories over the Soviet Union are still well-remembered in the minds of those who lived through it. Merely uttering the phrase “four to three” is enough to stir up emotions in Czechs and Slovaks who were there. Furthermore, a tribute to the plight of the Czechs and Slovaks during that time can still be seen whenever the New York Rangers take to the ice in the National Hockey

²⁵¹ Williams, *The Prague Spring and its Aftermath*, 199.

²⁵² Szulc, *Czechoslovakia Since World War II*, 474.

²⁵³ Skoug, *Czechoslovakia's Lost Fight for Freedom*, 233 and 239.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 239.

League (NHL) in North America. Jaromir Jagr, born in Kladno, Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic) and the captain of the New York Rangers, arguably one of the most talented and famous athletes to ever play ice hockey, wears number 68 on his jersey in honor of those who defied their oppressors.²⁵⁵ He has worn this number since his rookie year in the 1990-1991 season after he became the first Czechoslovak-born player to be drafted into the NHL without having to defect.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁵ Scott Morrison, *Hockey Night in Canada by the Numbers: from 00 to 99* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2007), 158-159.

²⁵⁶ 1998 Nagano Olympics, "Athlete Profile: Jaromir Jagr," CNN/SI, <http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/olympics/events/1998/nagano/athletes/122.htm> (accessed April 13, 2008).

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IV. A SEPTEMBER TO REMEMBER: 1972 SUMMIT SERIES, CANADA VS. THE SOVIET UNION

A. HISTORICAL SETTING: DETENTE

Within the framework of the Cold War era was the period of calming, or relaxing, of hostilities between the East and West commonly known as Détente. Often associated with the latter 1960s to early 1980s, attempts at improved relations between the two sides can at least be dated to January 1958 when the United States and the Soviet Union signed the first of several agreements addressing “cultural, technical, and educational exchanges.”²⁵⁷ It is within this context that Canada, engrossed in a post-Second World War identity crisis discussed in more detail later, made a conscious effort to distance itself with American foreign policy for fear of becoming too ‘Americanized’ as a nation.²⁵⁸

Canada independently engaged the Soviet Union and in the late 1960s reached a formal agreement that would “increase cultural, scientific and technological exchanges between both nations.”²⁵⁹ Notably, formal proposition of adding sporting exchanges to the agreement was subsequently put forward by the Department of External Affairs in 1967.²⁶⁰ After having expanded trade during the 1950s and 1960s with China, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau officially recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1970. Trudeau then met with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in Moscow in 1971 – a meeting that included discussion regarding the role of hockey in strengthening relations between their two nations.²⁶¹ That discussion would be the groundwork on which was laid the creation of the 1972 Summit Series between Canada and the Soviet Union to be

²⁵⁷ Kanin, “Superpower Sport in Cold War and Détente,” 254.

²⁵⁸ Philip Moore, “Practical Nostalgia and the Critique of Commodification: On the ‘Death of Hockey’ and the National Hockey League,” *The Australian Journal of Anthropology* 13:1 (2002): 316-317; Gregory H. Duquette, Daniel S. Mason, and Jay Scherer, “The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity: The 1972 Canada – USSR Summit Series,” in *East plays West: Sport and the Cold War*, ed. David L. Andrews and Stephen Wagg (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 165-168.

²⁵⁹ Duquette et al., “The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity,” 167.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 168.

held in September of that year – an ice hockey event that would become “politically charged...with extensive cultural repercussions.”²⁶²

B. HOCKEY AND CANADIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

Tune into the NHL Network on television and within one hour you will have been saturated with information and images designed to lead you to one conclusion – Canada *is* hockey. Jack Ludwig maintains that where little kids in other countries receive footballs, soccer balls, baseballs, or basketballs as their first “boy” gift after they are able to stand, in Canada those same little kids are given sticks – hockey sticks. As soon as is physically possible, the child then begins organized play and parents and coaches alike dream of them becoming the next Bobby Orr, Wayne Gretzky, or Mario Lemieux.²⁶³ Philip Moore claims that most of the Canadian sporting literature is devoted to hockey, but it is more substantive than stories merely about the game. “It is about identities constructed through the game, the sentimental memories of growing up and learning about life and what it is to be Canadian.”²⁶⁴ Hockey provides the center around which Canadian identity myths are based. Where does this Canadian identity associated with hockey come from and how accurate is it to say that Canada *is* hockey? Oddly enough, the answer lies within another sport, lacrosse.

In the mid-nineteenth century, prior to the formation of the Canadian confederation in 1867, the introduction of modern sport to Canada was a result of British influence.²⁶⁵ As in many other parts of the British Empire, sports normally associated with the elites of society were the same ones dominating Canadian sport such as cricket, golf and curling – sports that were “refined and gentlemanly...a breeding ground for proper British mores and values.”²⁶⁶ Lacrosse on the other hand was a violent game

²⁶² J. J. Wilson, “27 Remarkable Days: The 1972 Summit Series of Ice Hockey between Canada and the Soviet Union,” *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5:2 (2004): 271.

²⁶³ Jack Ludwig, *Hockey Night in Moscow* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1972), 13-15.

²⁶⁴ Moore, “Practical Nostalgia and the Critique of Commodification,” 313.

²⁶⁵ Bairner, *Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 116.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.; Michael A. Robidoux, “Imagining a Canadian Identity through Sport: A Historical Interpretation of Lacrosse and Hockey,” *Journal of American Folklore* 115:456 (2002): 214.

indigenous to the native, First Nations, peoples who referred to it as *baggataway* or *tewaarathon*.²⁶⁷ Indeed, two First Nations tribes intentionally used an inter-tribal *baggataway* match as a deception through which to launch an attack on Fort Michilimackinac during the Pontiac Rebellion in 1763 – the game being so violent that the British defenders of the fort were unaware they were being attacked until it was too late.²⁶⁸ Lacrosse was seen as being representative of the “rugged, brutal, and aggressive” Canadian settler of only who could tame the “unforgiving northern territory.”²⁶⁹

In the same decade Myroslav Tyrs created a gymnastic movement to foster a national identity in Czechoslovakia, Dr. William George Beers, a staunch supporter of “all things Canadian,” turned to lacrosse in an effort “to take advantage of the nationalistic fervor generated by the formation of the Canadian confederation” in that country.²⁷⁰ After learning *tewaarathon* from the Mohawk in the 1860s, Beers felt the game was the “perfect vehicle” for his “nationalist agenda” because it completely contradicted the genteel bourgeois sports representative of Britain.²⁷¹ Beers modified the Mohawk game, created standardized rules and equipment, and played a significant role in the founding of the National Lacrosse Association (NLA) in 1867 that put forward the slogan “Our Country and Our Game.”²⁷² Between 1867 and 1883, Beers organized several tours of Britain in which he illustrated the distinct “character of the new Canadian nation” through Canada’s new national game played by athletes wearing a maple leaf logo on their jerseys.²⁷³ Though Beers was instrumental in the spread of lacrosse and the rise in its popularity throughout Canada, Robidoux stresses that a “preexisting value” in

²⁶⁷ Bairner, *Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 117; Robidoux, “Imagining a Canadian Identity through Sport,” 214.

²⁶⁸ Robidoux, “Imagining a Canadian Identity through Sport,” 214.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 214-215.

²⁷⁰ Bairner, *Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 121.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*; Robidoux, “Imagining a Canadian Identity through Sport,” 214.

²⁷² Bairner, *Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 121.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*; Robidoux, “Imagining a Canadian Identity through Sport,” 215.

the sport lent to its acceptance by Canadians and it is in this where one begins to see the significance of lacrosse and hockey's significance to Canadian identity.²⁷⁴

Initially, lacrosse provided *les Canadiens* – the rugged, adventurous male of French decent – and his Anglo cousins of similar character an alternative to the bourgeois sport, culture, and “model of masculinity” associated with their nations of origin on the European continent through “its emphasis on physical aggression, volatility, and danger” and embodiment of the First Nations’ celebration of “physicality, stoicism, and bravado.”²⁷⁵ However, lacrosse became less violent and more structured over time in an effort to increase its appeal to a larger market, and the NLA was eventually ‘amatuerized’ in order to keep out the riff-raff so to speak – this essentially kept the working-class out of the game because the required amateur status of players prevented them from receiving a wage or any compensation for participation. Compounding the working-class participation problem was the fact that participation in sports was illegal on Sundays and the workweek ran from Monday through Saturday.²⁷⁶ Lacrosse had become the very type of sport it was born to oppose paving the way for the working-class to “pursue alternative sporting options” that had no restrictions on participation.²⁷⁷ Ice hockey, referred to simply as hockey throughout the rest of this discussion, filled that role.

By the 1920s, hockey had replaced lacrosse as the national sporting pastime largely due to the same reasons the latter had been so popular.²⁷⁸ A late nineteenth century amalgamation of other sports such as “bandy, shinty, Irish hurley, and field hockey,” hockey was also aggressive, violent, fast, and required a machismo characteristic of the “rugged, honest, [and] utilitarian” Canadian “national character” that had previously been prevalent in lacrosse.²⁷⁹ Hockey was also perceived as embodying

²⁷⁴ Robidoux, “Imagining a Canadian Identity through Sport,” 216.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 214 and 216.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 216-217.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 218.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.; Bairner, *Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 125; Don Morrow and Kevin B. Wamsley, *Sport in Canada: A History* (Don Mills, Ontario: 2005), 210.

the myth of Canadian colonial life in that it “was played on a frozen landscape” which represented the harsh conditions early settlers endured.²⁸⁰

With roots dating back to eighteenth century Nova Scotia and Dartmouth, Canada, Morrow and Wamsley maintain that hockey was firmly established in the majority of Canadian cities and towns by the turn of the century.²⁸¹ Professional leagues cropped up early as 1904, but the National Hockey League (NHL) assumed dominance by 1917 and ensured that dominance would last by expanding into the United States in the 1920s even though Canadian players continued to vastly outnumber American players.²⁸² Canadians also established dominance in international competition winning gold medals at all Olympic competitions between 1920 and 1952 with one exception, 1936 when Great Britain won with a team comprised of several Canadian players.²⁸³ Moreover, Canadian teams won the World Championship of Ice Hockey fifteen of the nineteen times the title was awarded between 1920 and 1952 – a truly noteworthy accomplishment.²⁸⁴ During Canada’s dominance of international play, Canadian teams were comprised of amateur players – normally, but not always, the Allan Cup champions each respective year – who routinely had their way with their opponents while barely breaking a sweat.²⁸⁵

This dominance lasted until 1954 when the defeat of the East York Lyndhursts at the hands of the Soviet Union by a score of 7-2 not only pushed several of the Canadian players to tears because “They felt they’d let down Canada,” but Canada itself was in an

²⁸⁰ Robidoux, “Imagining a Canadian Identity through Sport,” 218.

²⁸¹ Morrow and Wamsley, *Sport in Canada*, 210.

²⁸² The International Hockey League was the first professional hockey league and had its origins in the U. S. Morrow and Wamsley, *Sport in Canada*, 210-211.

²⁸³ Ibid., 211.

²⁸⁴ The World Championship of Ice Hockey title was awarded at each Olympiad between 1920 and 1928. Beginning in 1930, the World Championship tournament took place every year an Olympiad was not held. The tournament did not take place from 1940 to 1946 as a result of World War II and resumed again in 1947 when it occurred uninterrupted until 1980. Since 1980, only three tournaments have not taken place – 1980, 1984, and 1988. IIHF World Championships, “All Medalists: Men,” International Ice Hockey Federation, <http://www.iihf.com/iihf-home/home.html> (accessed April 24, 2008).

²⁸⁵ The Allan Cup has been presented to the best senior amateur men’s ice hockey team in Canada each year since 1908. Ludwig, *Hockey Night in Moscow*, 15.

“uproar.”²⁸⁶ The loss even affected members of the Canadian legation in Prague up to a year later. Sid Godber, a Canadian player in the 1955 World Championship tournament, recalls Canadian legation members continually mentioned that “every time they tried to negotiate anything they got hockey thrown up at them. They’d leave their cars to go somewhere and come back to find someone had painted 7-2 in red paint on the doors.”²⁸⁷ The Canadian team won the title back in 1955, but the Soviets had made it known that the Canadian amateurs would no longer be the dominant force they once were.²⁸⁸

As Canadian teams – still comprised of amateurs because international regulations did not allow members of professional hockey clubs to compete in international competitions – established a pattern of not achieving top honors at the international level over the 1950s and 1960s, the Canadian government eventually got involved when the national team took home the bronze medal at the 1968 Olympics and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau directed the formation of a task force designed to investigate the reasons for their less-than-superior performance.²⁸⁹ Out of the task force was born Hockey Canada, an organization comprised of members of government, the National Hockey League, the NHL Players’ Association (NHLPA) and representatives from the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association. Established in early 1969, Hockey Canada had two mandates of “fostering and developing hockey in Canada, and managing and developing the national team.”²⁹⁰ Restoring Canada to its rightful place at the top of the international hockey community was a priority and one of Hockey Canada’s first goals was to convince the International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF) to allow professional players to represent their countries in international competition.²⁹¹ Failure to do so

²⁸⁶ Scott Young, *War on Ice: Canada in International Hockey* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 20-21 and 243.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 36-37.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 243.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 150; Duquette et al., “The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity,” 169.

²⁹⁰ Duquette et al., “The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity,” 169; Young, *War on Ice*, 145 and 150.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 169.

resulted in Canada's immediate withdrawal from the 1970, 1971, and 1972 World Hockey Championship tournaments in addition to Canada's refusal to field a team for the 1972 Winter Olympics.²⁹²

There is another factor that affected Canada's imagined community worth noting at this time. In 1967, the NHL underwent its first expansion adding six teams, all U.S.-based, to the already existing six.²⁹³ This was perceived by many Canadians as a slap in the face of the nation that *gave* the game to the U.S., especially considering the growing ideological rift between the two countries fueled by the Suez Crisis in 1956, the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the previously mentioned rapprochement with China and the Soviet Union that Prime Minister Trudeau had championed, and Canada's conflicting view on the American policy in Vietnam.²⁹⁴ Many Canadians viewed the expansion of the NHL, in the form it took, as further infringement upon their country through what is known as *commodification* of their national sport. Essentially, the extreme capitalist drive in the United States was affecting hockey by disconnecting it from traditional Canadian cultural values by creating a 'product' in an "empty form suited for travel abroad" where it could be made more suitable for a "global cultural homogeneity."²⁹⁵ Indeed, the impact of American influence on Canadian culture was hotly debated. In reference to the economic dominance of hockey by the U.S., political scientist Bruce Kidd and journalist John Macfarlane – both Canadian – put forward that by 1972:

Hockey has come to symbolize our capitulation to the economic realities as surely as it does our triumph over the physical ones. We live in a country we no longer own. We merely lease it from the Americans. We have sold them our oil and gas, our minerals, our forests and most of our industry. ...We may still call it our national game, but like nearly everything else in this country we have sold it to the Americans.²⁹⁶

²⁹² Duquette et al., "The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity," 169.

²⁹³ Ibid., 168.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 166-168.

²⁹⁵ Moore, "Practical Nostalgia and the Critique of Commodification," 311.

²⁹⁶ Bruce Kidd and John Macfarlane, *The Death of Hockey* (Toronto: New Press, 1972), 15-16.

From this, one gets the sense that Kidd and Macfarlane do not approve of America's impact on *their* sport of hockey.

Taken within this context, the rise of Soviet dominance in hockey during the 1950s and 1960s was a significant threat to Canada's national identity. During the Soviet's ascendance in hockey prowess, Canada clung to the fact that their best players – the NHL professionals – had been restricted from competition, meaning that they, Canada as a nation, were still the best. Regardless if the Americans owned the NHL teams, Canada still produced the best players – a feeling individual Canadians could be proud of. The only thing Canada needed to do was find a way to show the world their best players mopping a hockey rink with the Soviet team.

C. JESUS MAY SAVE, BUT PAUL HENDERSON SCORES

In his efforts to bring the Soviet Union back into the realm of international relations with the West, Prime Minister Trudeau visited Moscow in 1971. Discussions with his counterpart, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, resulted in the Canadian-Soviet Protocol on Consultations driven by Trudeau's feeling that Canadian identity was being culturally and economically crowded by his neighbors to the south.²⁹⁷ Interestingly, the discussions between the two leaders included the sport of ice hockey – specifically its potential role in enhancing cultural exchange and the friendship between the two countries.²⁹⁸ In April 1972, Canada engaged the IIHF on the possibility of playing exhibition games against the Soviet Union and it was agreed the two countries would play eight games in September of the same year – four games in Canada, four games in the Soviet Union.²⁹⁹ Most important during the discussions was the determination that Canada would be able to field a team consisting of any Canadian citizen they could muster, even professionals.³⁰⁰

In a series that was designed “as an expression of goodwill between nations,” the Soviet Union would get a chance to show the world that communism was the superior

²⁹⁷ Duquette et al., “The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity,” 168.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 168-170; Wilson, “27 Remarkable Days,” 271.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., 170.

³⁰⁰ Duquette et al., “The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity,” 170

system and Canada would finally get a chance to prove they were “the best hockey players in the world.”³⁰¹ Prime Minister Trudeau also saw an opportunity to advertise a unified national identity and reduce domestic tensions among Anglophones, Francophones, and the First Nations peoples through the glorious defeat of a common enemy intent on stripping Canada’s claim on that which was so ingrained in Canadian identity.³⁰²

Do not let the *intended* goodwill fool you. One must remember that this was a time when political tension between the East and West was still great, and the real possibility of nuclear war was constant. Soon after World War II, Canada began pulling away from “the shadow of Britain and surfaced as an important middle power.”³⁰³ Canada did this while supporting the liberal internationalism of the United Nations and the maintenance of “peace through multilateral negotiation and diplomacy” even as it sought to retain “a collective security through strategic alliances with the US and other Western powers” against the Soviet threat, eventually embodied by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization formed in 1949.³⁰⁴ Thus, anti-communist sentiment among Canadians, had already been present since at least 1917, and it intensified since the end of the war.³⁰⁵ A harsh reality would only make that sentiment worse.

It is said that art and culture often reflect society. One can assume this includes sport as a part of culture. If so, the culture of the rough and brash adventurer who settled the Canadian wilderness was evident in the Canadian team’s rough and physical play throughout the series. At the same time, one could see the effects of the state-controlled

³⁰¹ Robidoux, “Imagining a Canadian Identity through Sport,” 221; Ludwig, *Hockey Night in Moscow* 24. The Soviet Union had beaten the Canadians in their previous seven meetings in international play to this point – Canadian teams comprised non-NHL players. Young, *War on Ice*, 244.

³⁰² Duquette et al., “The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity,” 173.

³⁰³ Ibid., 165.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., 165-166.

³⁰⁵ Corporate and government leaders in Canada blacklisted and fired people after the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 in addition to using propaganda designed to stir up a “Red Scare” to discredit left-wing activists and union organizers. In 1931, the leader of the Communist Party of Canada, Tim Buck, was imprisoned. Moreover, individuals participating in direct protests against Canada’s anti-communist alignment with the West were labeled “enemies of the nation” and declared traitors or communists by the Canadian government since at least 1917. Duquette et al., “The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity,” 166.

communist system in the Soviet team's systematic and disciplined play. "The contrasts were jarring at first," says CNNSI reporter Jon A. Dolezar.

The Soviets played like a ballet on ice, skating gracefully, passing crisply and always maintaining careful possession of the puck...it really was a sight to behold. Soviet hockey flowed like a beautiful Tchaikovski symphony. It was more complex than a Tolstoy novel. And it was prettier to look at than the most splendid Repin oil painting.³⁰⁶

Worst of all, the Soviet style of play seemed to work. The Soviet team crushed Team Canada 7-3 in the first game of the series played in Montreal on September 2 1972 despite the Canadians resorting to unusually violent play.³⁰⁷ After the game, most of the Canadian players, in disgust, immediately skated to the locker room ignoring the traditional handshake after the game – a handshake coach Harry Sinden swore they were unaware was supposed to take place.³⁰⁸ So much for sportsmanship – after all, they were in the midst of a Cold War.

As a nation, Canada was literally stunned by the loss. They had gotten caught up in what Jim Kernaghan called their "own self-deception" in reference to the arrogance with which the Canadians entered the series,³⁰⁹ an arrogance only matched in history, *maybe*, in the way Xerxes underestimated the Spartans and their Greek allies at Thermopylae. "The myth of Canadian hockey supremacy and the invincibility of the NHL players had been extinguished in one game."³¹⁰ J. J. Wilson called the loss "a national disaster for Canada."³¹¹ All was not lost however as there were still seven games left in which Canada would be able to wipe the ice with the Soviets, smugly claiming the loss in game one was a result of being unfamiliar with their opponents.

³⁰⁶ Jon A. Dolezar, "Sweeping changes: Russian hockey looked different after '72 Summit Series," SI.com, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/hockey/news/2002/09/27/soviet_legacy/ (accessed August 7, 2007).

³⁰⁷ Young, *War on Ice*, 246; Duquette et al., "The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity," 174.

³⁰⁸ Ludwig, *Hockey Night in Moscow*, 41.

³⁰⁹ Jim Kernaghan, "Opening salvo: Soviet win in Montreal slap in face to Canadians," SI.com, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/hockey/news/2002/09/26/kernaghan_summit_slam/ (accessed August 7, 2007).

³¹⁰ Duquette et al., "The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity," 174.

³¹¹ Wilson, "27 Remarkable Days," 272.

The Canadians won the second game in Toronto by a score of 4-1, thus restoring the confidence of all the fans, media, even government officials whose confidence had been shattered just a few days before.³¹² It was not a gentlemanly win in the tradition of the British influence of the nineteenth century that George Beers tried so hard to depose. No, victory in game two owed much to the character and identity that Beers sought to create. It reeked of violent, brutish, physical play that represented the rugged Canadian man braving attempting to tame the wilderness. Assistant coach John Ferguson made it clear how the Canadians play hockey, and how they would continue to play, when he said, "I don't care how we win, as long as we win."³¹³ The Canadians were back on track, so they thought.

Game three in Winnipeg resulted in the two teams skating to a 4-4 tie on September 6 in the wake of the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. Tradition dictated a minute of silence be observed before the game. Tradition was broken – thirty seconds were observed as the hockey series directly impacted Canada and was therefore seen to be more important as it was closer to home.³¹⁴ After game three, several Canadian players and coaches finally began coming off their high horses and recognizing that the Soviets not only came to play, but they *could* play *and* coach – the ironic thing about it was that the foundation of Russian hockey lay in *The Hockey Handbook* written by Lloyd Percival – a Canadian.³¹⁵

Through Cialdini one sees how and why fans can become so attached to a sporting team, so engrossed in that team's performance. When Team Canada lost the fourth game in Vancouver by a score of 5-3, they were relentlessly booed by the fans and run off the ice.³¹⁶ The fans had trusted that Team Canada would defend their honor and uphold their self-esteem. So far, the fans felt they had been let down three times in four games and Canadian pride was as low as it had ever been. Their disapproving actions

³¹² Wilson, "27 Remarkable Days," 74.

³¹³ Duquette et al., "The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity," 175.

³¹⁴ Ibid., 176.

³¹⁵ Duquette et al., "The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity," 176.

³¹⁶ Ludwig, *Hockey Night in Moscow*, 75-82.

towards their players prompted one of the most famous events in Canadian history. After the game, on live television, team captain Phil Esposito addressed all of Canada and “scolded” the fans for not supporting *their* team. “Some of our guys are really down in the dumps,” he said.³¹⁷ “They’ve got a good team...it doesn’t mean we’re not giving it our 150 per cent because we certainly are...we came [to play for Canada] because we love Canada.”³¹⁸

Esposito’s plea seemed to rekindle the burn of Canadian nationalism and approximately 3,000 Canadians, including a group of Quebecois, ‘invaded’ the Soviet Union for the final four games in Moscow in the latter half of September.³¹⁹ They wanted to see *their boys* show the ‘commies’ who was the best at this game and in doing so they exhibited some of the worst nationalistic and patriotic behavior one could imagine – behavior transcending that of behavior normally associated with the ‘ugly American.’³²⁰ *Their boys* were not saints either.

The Soviets were intent on continuing their dominance over the Canadian team and won game five at the Luzhniki Sports Palace in Moscow 5-4, but the support from the Canadian fans was steadfast and Team Canada found strength in it.³²¹ In game six, “Team Canada’s desperation and ongoing resort to violence climaxed” in a 3-2 victory.³²² During the game, Ferguson would order Team Canada forward Bobby Clarke to go out and “break [Valery Kharmalov’s] ankle” and “put him out of the series.”³²³

Game seven, a Soviet loss, was filled with more violence. Using his skate blade, Soviet forward Boris Mikhailov repeatedly kicked Canadian Gary Bergman in the shin until he finally penetrated the shin-pad and cut into Bergman’s leg.³²⁴ A brawl between

³¹⁷ Denis Gibbons, “Summit Series an Eye-Opener,” *The Hockey News*, Sixty Moments that Changed the Game Collector’s Edition, 2007.

³¹⁸ Wilson, “27 Remarkable Days,” 274-275.

³¹⁹ Ibid., 275; Ludwig, *Hockey Night in Moscow*, 103.

³²⁰ Ludwig, *Hockey Night in Moscow*, 102.

³²¹ Wilson, “27 Remarkable Days,” 275-276.

³²² Duquette et al., “The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity,” 178.

³²³ Ibid., 179.

³²⁴ Wilson, “27 Remarkable Days,” 276.

the two teams ensued and players were separated with Bergman “pointing to Mikhailov while making a throat-slitting gesture.”³²⁵ The series was tied and tensions were high going into the eighth and final game.

On September 28 1972, schools across Canada cancelled classes as television sets were set up in gymnasiums so students could watch the memorable event, and factories and businesses were shut down around the country.³²⁶ It is estimated that between 7.5 and 15 million of 21.8 million Canadians watched or listened the broadcast.³²⁷ This was not just a game, Canada’s national identity was at stake and if Team Canada lost game eight, to those watching, it would have been like watching the death of Canada in a way.

The tension in the series was so great by this point, the Canadians nearly refused to play because of a conflict over the officiating crew that the Soviets had scheduled to work the game. The situation was of such magnitude that Canadian Senator Arthur Laing and even Ambassador Ford got involved.³²⁸ A compromise was eventually reached, and Team Canada took the ice.

It was a heated, physical game much like the previous games of the series, and it was a game Canada *had* to win if it was going to salvage its pride.³²⁹ Game eight had its share of incidents as Team Canada resorted to their typical rugged, physical tactics. A Canadian player was ejected from the game for threatening an on-ice official with his stick, Canadian Coach Harry Sinden threw a chair onto the ice, and his assistant made choking gestures at the officials – all caught on camera and all in the middle of Mother Russia.³³⁰

³²⁵ Duquette et al., “The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity,” 179.

³²⁶ Wilson, “27 Remarkable Days,” 277.

³²⁷ Ibid., 277; Duquette et al., “The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity,” 179.

³²⁸ Young, *War on Ice*, 185-188.

³²⁹ At the beginning of game eight, each team had won three games and tied one. If game eight ended in a tie, the Soviet Union would technically win because they would have scored more goals over the course of the series.

³³⁰ Duquette et al., “The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity,” 179.

The Soviets were ahead by two goals in the third period before Team Canada mounted a comeback and the most unusual event of the series took place. Just when it seemed that Canadian Yvonne Cournoyer tied the game at five apiece, mayhem broke out. Jack Ludwig recounts that when the red light behind the goal did not turn on to signal a goal, NHLPA Executive Director Alan Eagleson bolted for the scoring officials' bench in a fit before two Soviet policemen apprehended him. As it was happening, Team Canada player Pete Mahovlich, at 6'8" saw what was going on, then lurched over the boards into the crowd and brandished his stick at the policemen. He was immediately followed by the rest of Team Canada who managed to pull Eagleson away from the policemen and brought him to the players' bench. Every Canadian in the crowd went ballistic as Eagleson, in his new safe-haven, presented his Soviet hosts first with a finger and then his whole arm before a "detachment of police" came in and established a cordon around the spot where the incident took place. Order was finally restored after Mahovlich and Eagleson openly "challenged Soviet authority" and the game resumed with nearly seven minutes left to play.³³¹

With the game clock winding down with less than a minute to play, Canadian forward Paul Henderson, scorer of the game-winning goals in games six and seven, leaped from the bench and headed to the Soviet net. After getting knocked down and crashing into the end-boards, Henderson jumped up and to the front of the net where the puck had been redirected by the Soviet goaltender, Vladislav Tretiak. Henderson took two whacks at the puck – the first was stopped by Tretiak, the second found the back of the net with 34 seconds left to play.³³²

D. LEGACY

The "single most important moment in the history of Canadian sports" sparked tremendous celebrations in Canada and by the fans that traveled to Moscow to watch the event first-hand.³³³ The Summit Series and Henderson's goal are well revered in

³³¹ Ludwig, *Hockey Night in Moscow*, 174-176.

³³² Paul Henderson, interview by Jon A. Dolezar, SI.com, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/hockey/news/2002/09/27/henderson_interview/ (accessed August 7, 2007).

³³³ Wilson, "27 Remarkable Days," 277.

Canada. Some liken the event for Canadians as that of the assassination of John F. Kennedy to Americans – anyone alive when it happened can tell you exactly where they were precisely when it happened.³³⁴ In 2000, the Dominion Institute conducted a survey among Canadians “to determine the top-ten greatest events in Canadian history – Henderson’s goal is ranked fifth, wedged between Canada’s military victory at Vimy Ridge in the First World War...and Canada’s role in the Second World War.”³³⁵ The Summit Series itself is also thought to be the one event that has inspired the most literature in Canada.³³⁶

At the same time the Summit Series preserved Canada’s national identity, it served to unify a country comprised of multiple nationalities – at least for one month. It provided an arena in which a cultural cross-pollination between East and West took place as hockey officials in North America recognized the skill of the Soviets and “embraced the Soviet approach to training” and would incorporate several of the Soviet methods over the years to come – the Soviets would do the same.³³⁷ The series also paved the way for Europeans to play in the NHL, though the first Russian would not be allowed to join by The Soviet Union until 1983.³³⁸

The Summit Series also provides an example of how sport can lend to the breaking down of barriers of hatred. Despite acts such as Team Canada member Bill Goldsworthy’s screaming of “Fuck You!” at the Soviet team immediately after Henderson’s goal³³⁹ – an act that one hopes was only the result of emotions running wild in the moment – the bond that the players shared as ersatz soldiers fighting for their countries allowed them to get past the state-sponsored, propaganda-driven hatred of the ‘others’ and see each other as human beings. For example, years after the series, Yvan

³³⁴ Wilson, “27 Remarkable Days,” 277-278; Duquette et al., “The Cold War and the (re)articulation of Canadian national identity,” 163; Associated Press, “They were our enemies,” SI.com, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/hockey/news/2002/09/27/summit_anniversary_ap/ (accessed August 7, 2007).

³³⁵ Wilson, “27 Remarkable Days,” 278.

³³⁶ Moore, “Practical Nostalgia and the Critique of Commodification,” 313.

³³⁷ Wilson, “27 Remarkable Days,” 279.

³³⁸ Dolezar, “Sweeping changes.”

³³⁹ Ludwig, *Hockey Night in Moscow*, 42.

Cournoyer was invited to speak at a celebration in Moscow with members of the Soviet Team, and former Soviet team member Evgeny Mishakov said “I have only the best feelings about them. I’ve met them several times since, and we are friends.”³⁴⁰

Canada held a 30-year commemoration for the event with a series of dinners, speeches, reunions, autograph sessions, and the like. The television network ESPN Classic Canada even rebroadcast the original games and a series of DVDs were released to honor the games that took place in the summer of 1972.³⁴¹ For Canada, the Summit Series might as well have been commemorated in a manner befitting a battle commemoration. In the words of Canadian journalist Dick Beddoes, “Napoleon didn’t take Moscow, the Nazis got within twenty-one miles in 1943, but in a war of a different kind, Team Canada conquered Moscow”³⁴² – and in doing so reinforced a piece of Canadian mythology. Paul Henderson had “saved Canada.”³⁴³

³⁴⁰ Vladislav Tretiak, interview by Jon A. Dolezar, SI.com, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/hockey/news/2002/09/27/tretiak_interview/.

³⁴¹ Associated Press, “They were our enemies.”

³⁴² Wilson, “27 Remarkable Days,” 278.

³⁴³ Mark Mulvoy, “Waking Up from a Nightmare,” SI.com, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/si_online/flashback/waking_up_from_a_nightmare/ (accessed August 7, 2007).

V. “DO YOU BELIEVE IN MIRACLES!?”: 1980 WINTER OLYMPICS, THE UNITED STATES VS. THE SOVIET UNION

A. HISTORICAL SETTING: A LOW POINT IN AMERICAN HISTORY

In January 1977, James Earl Carter was inaugurated as the thirty-ninth President of the United States of America. Soon thereafter, he set himself and his staff to task in improving the domestic and international situations for the U.S. encumbered by the Indochina defeat, the energy crisis, a muddled international system racked with inflation and a Soviet system that seemed ascendant. Though nobody knew it at the time, President Carter’s policies and actions as President would contribute significantly to the political atmosphere of a single hockey game that would vastly impact the mood of America at a pivotal moment and the character of American foreign policy in the renewal of the cold war at the beginning of the 1980s.

To be sure, in January 1980, the international and domestic situations in the United States were relatively dismal. The country was not too far removed from President Nixon’s resignation in 1974 resulting from the Watergate investigation³⁴⁴ or a less than desirable end to the war in Vietnam with the evacuation of the American embassy in 1975,³⁴⁵ a conflict that weighed heavily on the minds of the American people.

A cornerstone of Nixon’s foreign policy had been a reliance of proxies to compensate for the diminished U.S. stance in the wake of Vietnam. Nowhere was this fact more present than on the Persian Gulf. The stability of Iran steadily degraded from 1975 to 1978 as the Iranian people became displeased with the repressive rule of Shah Pahlavi. The U.S.-backed Shah was eventually overthrown and power was taken by Ayatollah Khomeini in early 1979.³⁴⁶ In retaliation to American support for the deposed

³⁴⁴ Watergate Story, “Nixon Resigns,” Washingtonpost.com, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/watergate/part3.html> (accessed May 5, 2008).

³⁴⁵ Joseph H. Alexander, Don Horan, and Norman C. Stahl, *The Battle History of the U.S. Marines: a Fellowship of Valor* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1999), 360.

³⁴⁶ R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 1514-1515.

Shah, militant Iranians seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took over ninety hostages in November 1979.³⁴⁷ Though several were released later that month, fifty-three Americans would remain hostage for over 400 days.³⁴⁸ President Carter responded by implementing an embargo on oil imports from Iran and seeking UN support to denounce the takeover – failing due to a veto by the Soviet Union.³⁴⁹

Just over a month after the fiasco in Iran, the Soviet Union shocked the world by invoking the Brezhnev Doctrine and invading Afghanistan on December 24, 1979.³⁵⁰ Angered, President Carter replied with diplomatic sanctions: an embargo on grain exports to the Soviet Union, restricted Soviet access to fishing waters, suspension of the sale of computer technology to the Soviet Union, and a boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics scheduled for Moscow.³⁵¹ In January 1980, Carter publicly recognized the importance of the Persian Gulf's fossil fuels to the United States and he eventually sent military and medical aid to the Afghan rebels.³⁵²

On the American domestic front, things were no better as Carter's economic policies proved ineffective. The recession that had followed the 1973 oil crisis had contributed to a decrease in production, a rise in unemployment, and a steady rise in inflation. OPEC pricing policies and the Iranian oil embargo contributed to a 120 percent rise in oil prices in 1979.³⁵³ Inflation that year hovered between 12 and 13 percent.³⁵⁴ Between 1977 and 1980, economic growth fell to 1.2 percent, unemployment rose to 7.1 percent, and inflation reached 13.5 percent.³⁵⁵ Carter's administration was having a very

³⁴⁷ Garland A. Haas, *Jimmy Carter and the Politics of Frustration* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1992), 109.

³⁴⁸ Dupuy and Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History*, 1515.

³⁴⁹ Haas, *Jimmy Carter and the Politics of Frustration*, 110.

³⁵⁰ Higham and Kagan, *The Military History of the Soviet Union*, 257-262.

³⁵¹ Mary G. McDonald, "'Miraculous' masculinity meets militarization," in *East Plays West: Sport and the Cold War*, ed. David L. Andrews and Stephen Wagg (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 228; Erwin C. Hargrove, *Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the Public Good* (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 155.

³⁵² McDonald, "'Miraculous' masculinity meets militarization," 228.

³⁵³ Hargrove, *Jimmy Carter as President*, 101.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 95.

difficult time with the economy and Americans had become impatient. “For the first time in American history, when pollsters asked citizens about what life would be like in five years, a majority said they thought it would be worse, not better.”³⁵⁶

The country needed a shot in the arm and the Americans could only hope that their hosting of the Winter Olympics in early 1980 would not follow a trend of national setbacks during the 1970s. That shot would come from the unlikely results of a hockey game against the Soviet national team.

B. SOLDIERS AGAINST BOYS: THE SUPERIOR SOVIET SYSTEM?

Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union can be traced back to at least the early twentieth century when Americans took great pride in defeating the upper-class European “aristocrat athletes” with “strapping republican youths who took time away from their useful occupation in order to compete,” thus proving “America was the society of the future.”³⁵⁷ This idea found its way into the American military. General Douglas MacArthur, who led the 1928 U.S. Olympic team, was quoted as saying:

Athletic America...suggests health and happiness. It arouses national pride. It enkindles the national spirit....Nothing is more characteristic of the genius of the American people than is their genius for athletics.³⁵⁸

America became proud of athletic achievement, and by the mid-1970s it had taken on such a significant role in international relations, Vice-President Gerald Ford stated:

Do we realize how important it is to compete successfully with other nations? Not just the Russians, but many nations that are growing and challenging. Being a leader, the U. S. has an obligation to set high standards...a sports triumph can be as uplifting to a nation’s spirit as, well, a battlefield victory.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁶ Wayne R. Coffey, *The Boys of Winter: The Untold Story of a Coach, a Dream, and the 1980 U.S. Olympic Hockey Team* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2005), 17.

³⁵⁷ Kanin, “Superpower Sport in Cold War and Détente,” 249-250.

³⁵⁸ Ibid., 250.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

Once the Soviet Union came into existence, it soon realized the importance of sport and physical culture to the propagation of the socialist ideology of Marx and Lenin (Chapter II). Furthermore, the Soviet Union realized that even though competitive sport was seen as a product of the bourgeois culture of the West, participation in international sporting events was a way to display the superiority of socialism over capitalism. Thus, international competition was “another form of class warfare.”³⁶⁰ By the time the Soviet Union participated in its first Olympics in 1952, the Cold War was well underway and hatred between them and the U.S. was more than apparent during the festival.³⁶¹

One tactic used by the Soviet Union to display superiority over other nation-states was to identify a sport with strong cultural ties to another country, learn the sport, become proficient at it, then best the country of its origin at it on the international stage.³⁶² Beginning with a victory over the Canadian national team at the 1954 World Championship, the Soviets began their dominance of international ice hockey winning sixteen of twenty-six possible World Championship gold medals and five of six possible Olympic gold medals between 1954 and 1979.³⁶³ This Soviet dominance caused the Canadian national identity crisis that led to the 1972 Summit Series between the two nations – the results of which have been immortalized in Canada (Chapter IV). Also in 1972, the Soviet national basketball team astonished the world when it defeated the

³⁶⁰ Kanin, “Superpower Sport in Cold War and Détente,” 251.

³⁶¹ Ibid., 252.

³⁶² Designed to prove the superiority of socialism over capitalism, this tactic may have its origins in Tsarist Russia. Peter the Great’s recruitment of European military experts and Catherine the Great’s amassing of European art as they sought to bring Russia, considered ‘backward’ at the time, on par with the West are well known among scholars. Russia’s achievement resultant of European influence manifests itself in such things as the musical works of Musorgskii and Tchaikovsky, the literature of Chekhov, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy, the art of Repin, the jewelry of Faberge, and the Bolshoi ballet.

³⁶³ In every World Championship tournament between 1954 and 1979, the Soviet Union placed in the top three with the exception of 1962 when they did not participate. Young, *War on Ice*, 243; Coffey, *The Boys of Winter*, 6; International Ice Hockey Federation, “Past Medallists,” International Ice Hockey Federation, <http://www.iihf.com/channels/iihf-world-championship/home/past-medallists.html> (accessed May 7, 2008); Hockey CCCP International, “Games,” Hockey CCCP International, <http://www.chidlovski.com/personal/1954/> (accessed May 7, 2008).

American team – previously riding a 52-game winning streak in international play – in a match surrounded by enormous controversy at the Munich Olympics.³⁶⁴

The Soviets were serious about achieving greatness in all they did, especially when an opportunity to display superiority over another nation presented itself as sporting events and Olympic festivals did. Thus, Soviet athletes were nurtured by the state in order to show the rest of the world the superiority of their socialist system. The Soviet national hockey team was comprised mostly of military officers who were officers in name only as they spent the vast majority of the year in state-funded training with state-funded equipment and facilities. Additionally, Soviet athletes were required to be “enrolled in some kind of education program” that could range from anything such as petroleum engineering to kinesiology.³⁶⁵ Thus, Soviet athletes were able to retain amateur status enabling them to compete in internationally sanctioned events.

In contrast, the U.S. hockey team was comprised primarily of college students with a few older players possessing more experience – all were unquestionably amateurs however as opposed to the pseudo-professional *shamateurs* making up the Soviet team.³⁶⁶ The U.S. hockey team received no financial backing from the American government and the players had to voluntarily attend a try-out camp to compete for a spot on the team roster.³⁶⁷ Bairner argues that this immediately placed the U.S. team at a disadvantage as many top American athletes joined the professional ranks as soon as possible in pursuit of “lucrative career opportunities” making them ineligible for Olympic competition.³⁶⁸ The Soviets, on the other hand, were able to see their best athletes compete in internationally sanctioned events due to their technically amateur status.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁴ Michael Burgan, *Great Moments in the Olympics* (Milwaukee, WI: World Almanac Library, 2002), 18-21.

³⁶⁵ Ludwig, *Hockey Night in Moscow*, 134.

³⁶⁶ Coffey, *The Boys of Winter*, 20 and 227; Bairner, *Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 112.

³⁶⁷ Coffey, *The Boys of Winter*, 20; Bairner, *Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 112.

³⁶⁸ Bairner, *Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 112.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

The perceived American disadvantages contributed to skepticism on the part of experts regarding the U.S. hockey team's potential performance at the Olympic tournament. Even coach Herb Brooks thought their chances of winning a gold medal were "slim and none" while considering that his team, with an average age of 22 years old, would be lucky to "sneak away with a bronze medal" even if they did not have to play the Soviet national team.³⁷⁰

Thus, the proverbial stage was set for a showdown between East and West, communism and capitalism, the Russian Bear and the American Eagle, 'their' way and 'our' way, experience and youth, soldiers and boys.

C. THE AMERICAN "ERUPTION"

Prior to the 1980 Winter Olympiad in Lake Placid, the U.S. hockey team embarked on a sixty-one-game training tour beginning in September 1979.³⁷¹ Before this, Coach Brooks faced probably his toughest challenge of his life – he had to pick the players and find a way to "surmount the entrenched regionalism the players carried within them."³⁷² Brooks was able to achieve this by making himself the sole focus of the hatred among the players and brought the U.S. team into their final exhibition match against the Soviet national team with a record of 42-15-3 prior to the Olympic tournament.³⁷³

The American team was able to surprise nearly everyone by sweeping through the preliminary round of the Olympic tournament with a 4-0-1 record. Along the way to the medal round, they tied a very strong team from Sweden and astonishingly defeated what many considered the second-best team in the world, Czechoslovakia, by a score of 7-3.³⁷⁴ The U.S. team would face the Soviet team first in the medal round, and the Soviets were

³⁷⁰ Wayne Coffey, *Olympic Gold! 1980 U. S. Hockey Team* (Woodbridge, CT: Blackbirch Press, 1993), 7 and 11-16.

³⁷¹ Coffey, *The Boys of Winter*, 11.

³⁷² The preponderance of the team members had played hockey at the University of Minnesota or the University of Boston, a rivalry in American hockey almost as strong as the rivalry between the Hungarian and the Slovak peoples. Coffey, *The Boys of Winter*, 8-9.

³⁷³ Coffey, *The Boys of Winter*, 9; and Burgan, *Great Moments in the Olympics*, 31.

³⁷⁴ Burgan, *Great Moments in the Olympics*, 31.

expected by the experts to walk all over the Americans – again. In addition to drubbing a team of NHL all-stars 6-0 in February 1979, supposedly the best *North America* had to offer, the Soviets obliterated the U.S. team days before the 1980 Olympics began by a score of 10-3 in New York’s Madison Square Garden.³⁷⁵ In the medal round, the American public now saw an opportunity to not only avenge the loss in Madison Square Garden on American soil, but to even the score with the Soviets for their invasion of Afghanistan on an ersatz battlefield made of ice.

The buzz in Lake Placid about the U.S. hockey team began when they beat Czechoslovakia and continued to grow with each new victory as they worked their way through the preliminary round. The team of young, hard-working college kids that reflected white middle-class America had now given the American public something they could cheer about, something they could be proud of. Amateur American hockey players were “carrying the load for the President, the State Department, the Pentagon, the hostages, General Motors, Dow Jones, the Saturday Evening Post and the Four Freedoms.”³⁷⁶

The U.S. hockey team was riding an emotional high into the game against the Soviet national team, but could not help but remember the last time an American team beat a Soviet team was in 1960 at Squaw Valley. Moreover, the Soviets had not lost an Olympic match since 1968 and were on a 21-Olympic game winning streak.³⁷⁷ It was a daunting task for the U.S. team merely in hockey terms without the added political and domestic pressure the country seemed to be placing on their shoulders. Oddly enough, the politics did not matter in the least to the American players. Coach Brooks had never allowed politics to infect the minds of his players throughout their entire time together. Twenty-five years after the Lake Placid Olympics, American team captain Mike Eruzione, remembers:

³⁷⁵ Coffey, *Olympic Gold*, 6-9; McDonald, “‘Miraculous’ masculinity meets militarization,” 222.

³⁷⁶ The Four Freedoms, as designated by American President Franklin D. Roosevelt are essentially freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. McDonald, “‘Miraculous’ masculinity meets militarization,” 225.

³⁷⁷ Leonard Shapiro, “U.S. Shocks Soviets in Ice Hockey, 4-3,” *Washingtonpost.com*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/sports/longterm/olympics1998/history/memories/80-hock.htm> (accessed August 7, 2008).

As players, we had no concept of that. We were so focused, it was as if we were playing with blinders on. Herb had us geared to play a hockey game and he kept the outside stuff out of it.³⁷⁸

On Friday, February 22, 1980, the hockey arena, which was designed to hold approximately 8,500 people, was packed with upwards of 10,000 who went to watch the American and Soviet national hockey teams face-off in their quests for Olympic gold.³⁷⁹ Flags and banners representing the fans' support of the U.S. team were abundant. The Soviets scored first, but the Americans rallied bringing a 2-2 tie to the first intermission.³⁸⁰ The Americans were stunned at the start of the second period when they saw early signs of Soviet panic as their coach, Viktor Tikhonov, replaced Vladislav Tretiak – well known as the best goaltender in the entire world.³⁸¹ The Soviets led by a goal at the end of the second period, but the fans did not waver as they were about to be treated to what has been called the “single most indelible moment in all of U.S. sports history.”³⁸² Forward Mark Johnson tied the game with nearly eleven minutes to play. Just over a minute later, Eruzione, whose name means ‘eruption’ in Italian, scored what would end up being the game-winning goal sending the crowd into an eruption of jubilation.³⁸³ The American team withstood the ensuing Soviet onslaught and kept them scoreless into the final seconds when announcer Al Michaels shouted the now famous phrase, “Do you believe in miracles? Yes!”³⁸⁴

³⁷⁸ Associated Press, “Do you believe in miracles? Yes!” MSNBC.com, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6969410/print/1/displaymode/1098/> (accessed August 7, 2007).

³⁷⁹ Coffey, *Olympic Gold*, 20.

³⁸⁰ Coffey, *The Boys of Winter*, 95.

³⁸¹ Ibid., 113.

³⁸² Jim Huber, “A golden moment: Remembering the Miracle on Ice,” CNN.com, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/thenetwork/news/2000/02/21/cnnsicomprofile_miracleonice/ (accessed August 7, 2007).

³⁸³ Burgan, *Great Moments in the Olympics*, 32-33; Coffey, *The Boys of Winter*, 224-225.

³⁸⁴ Coffey, *The Boys of Winter*, 235-241.

Around the entire world, Americans celebrated. In Babbitt, Minnesota, people were firing shotguns outdoors.³⁸⁵ In Santa Monica, California, an elderly immigrant grocer began to cry when told the U.S. team had just beaten the Russians.³⁸⁶ Ten drivers – all strangers – pulled their vehicles over on the side of a busy highway in the middle of a thunderstorm and began dancing together when they heard the news.³⁸⁷ Afloat in the Mediterranean Sea, the U.S.S. *Nimitz* signaled the score to a nearby Soviet ship.³⁸⁸ President Carter immediately phoned Coach Brooks at the arena – before any medal standings had even been decided in hockey.³⁸⁹

The magnitude of the victory over the Soviets was so great that most Americans probably do not remember that the U.S. hockey team still had one game to play, and was not even guaranteed a medal after defeating the Soviets. Two days later, on February 24 1980, the U.S. team played Finland and came from behind to win, securing the gold medal.³⁹⁰ In front of American Vice President Walter Mondale who was in attendance, the American hockey team completed their ‘Miracle on Ice’ inspiring the Vice President to comment “This is one of the greatest moments I’ve been through in my life.”³⁹¹ President Carter called again inviting Coach Brooks and the team to the White House, telling Brooks “We were trying to do business, and nobody could do it. We were watching the TV with one eye and Iran and the economy with the other.”³⁹² President Carter sent Air Force One to pick them up.³⁹³

³⁸⁵ E. M. Swift, “A Reminder of What We Can Be: The stirring upset victory by the 1980 U.S. hockey team made those Olympians our Sportsmen of the Year,” CNNSI.com, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/features/cover/news/2000/02/17/a_reminder_of_what_we_can_be/ (accessed August 7, 2007).

³⁸⁶ Swift, “A Reminder of What We Can Be.”

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Coffey, *The Boys of Winter*, 247.

³⁸⁹ Ibid., 245.

³⁹⁰ Ibid., 252-257.

³⁹¹ Borgan, *Great Moments in the Olympics*, 56.

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ Coffey, *The Boys of Winter*, 260.

D. LEGACY

So one might ask in retrospect why such a game has historical meaning. On the surface, the game was no more important than anything else that took place in Lake Placid that year. In fact, American forward Mark Pavelich said, “. . . it was just a hockey game” that the team wanted to win for themselves, not for a political statement.³⁹⁴ On a purely sporting level, the victory opened the eyes of NHL executives in regards to the ability of American players and paved the way for future American players to establish themselves in the league. However, regardless of Pavelich’s or the rest of the team’s sentiments, plainly this game at this moment in the national consciousness had tremendous effects with the American people and in American politics at the dawn of the 1980s.

At a previously described dismal point in American history, the victory over the Soviets and subsequently winning the gold medal “boosted the spirits of a wounded nation during an uncanny period when Americans doubted their country’s stature and themselves.”³⁹⁵ Contrary to the myths created by the media, journalists, and the Carter administration, the 1980 U.S. Olympic hockey team was not a bunch of innocent, young school kids with no chance in hell of beating the Soviet team that year. In fact, they were very talented and the majority went on to play in the NHL.³⁹⁶ It was just that idea though – of hard-working, honest, young working-class Americans – that America fell in love with. “They were not just a team, they were a perfect reflection of how Americans wanted to perceive themselves.”³⁹⁷ Eruzione commented the team came to “typify the American people” in that they possessed a dream – the gold medal – and chased after it like their immigrant ancestors who traveled to America were chasing their own dreams.³⁹⁸ This team faced a magnanimous obstacle in defeating the Soviet hockey team

³⁹⁴ Swift, “A Reminder of What We Can Be.”

³⁹⁵ Brian Murphy, “American Awakening,” *The Hockey News*, Sixty Moments that Changed the Game Collector’s Edition, 2007.

³⁹⁶ Burgan, *Great Moments in the Olympics*, 32.

³⁹⁷ Swift, “A Reminder of What We Can Be.”

³⁹⁸ McDonald, “‘Miraculous’ masculinity meets militarization,” 226.

and rose to the challenge, much like those hardy people who settled the unforgiving North American continent so many years before, and the American nation in 1980 loved it.

In addition to the Mardi Gras-like jubilation in which the American nation was basked after the victory, some experts assert that President Carter and his administration saw an opportunity to deflect much of the national discontent with their policy failures. “President Carter’s congratulatory attitude toward the Olympic hockey team...was meant to harness the excitement that had greeted US Olympic victories in order to enhance public support for his administration’s policies.”³⁹⁹ During the hockey team’s visit to the White House, President Carter declared “this is one of the proudest moments I have ever experienced. I am deeply grateful for your tremendous achievements.”⁴⁰⁰ Additionally, Speaker of the House Thomas O’Neill offered that the victory was

a great lift to the American people, and it goes beyond that. There is nothing the Soviets appreciate more than sports – it is their one area of freedom – and their biggest sport is hockey. And now with the United States boycott [of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics] you can believe me, heads will eventually roll in Russia.⁴⁰¹

Former American President Richard Nixon lamented that Carter had weakened the American nation to a point where the lack of a determined national will enabled the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the hostage crisis in Tehran as the U.S. was devolving towards minor power status.⁴⁰² McDonald puts forth that “immediate corrective action was needed” to counter Carter’s ineffective leadership and “ill-conceived policies.”⁴⁰³ The 1980 U.S. hockey team, through their “hard-bodied masculine resolve,” provided the impetus for that corrective action embodied in President Ronald Reagan’s tenure.⁴⁰⁴ The U.S. hockey team’s victory over the Soviet Union in 1980 did not force the Soviets to

³⁹⁹ McDonald, “‘Miraculous’ masculinity meets militarization,” 229.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., 229-230.

⁴⁰² Ibid., 230.

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., 231.

withdraw from Afghanistan or scare the militant Iranians into releasing the hostages in Tehran. What the victory did do, quite possibly, is provide President Reagan with the confidence to address those concerns in a manner yielding favorable results to the United States. It is within this context that the U.S. hockey victory “both anticipated and helped promote the broader sentiment, which eventually became known as the ‘Reagan Revolution’” which propelled the United States to its previously influential status as the defender of the Western world from communism.⁴⁰⁵

Ironically, in order to beat the Soviet Union in 1980, Coach Brooks was forced to take a group of individuals raised in a capitalist, liberal democracy that placed high value in individual success and wealth, and form a cohesive unit whose mantra was teamwork. Coach Brooks drove it into his players’ minds that the name on front of their jerseys was far more important than the name on the back of their jerseys.⁴⁰⁶ His team exemplified synergy. The 1980 U.S. hockey team was a group of men working in a *collective*, without which they most likely would never have been able to defeat the Soviet hockey team who represented an ‘evil’ communist, collective-driven socialist society – the embodiment of capitalism’s enemy.

In 2004, Disney released the movie *Miracle* about the U.S. victory over the Soviets. Bracey, Falcons, and Silk offer that through the film, the momentous achievement of the U.S. hockey team once again offers Americans a diversion from the depressing realities of another time in American history: domestic racial tension highlighted by Hurricane Katrina, President George W. Bush’s incompetence regarding all aspects of that hurricane, his administration’s inept handling of the social security issue, the growing death toll in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Guantanamo Bay fiasco.⁴⁰⁷ The 1980 victory over the Soviet Union by the United States may have only been a hockey game, but it is more than evident that its legacy lives and the American myth perseveres.

⁴⁰⁵ McDonald, “‘Miraculous’ masculinity meets militarization,” 231.

⁴⁰⁶ The U. S. hockey team’s jerseys were adorned with a large “U S A” crest on the front. On the back of the jerseys were individual player names. Bryan Bracey, Mark Falcons, and Michael Silk, “Performing America’s past: Cold War fantasies in a perpetual state of war,” in *East Plays West: Sport and the Cold War*, ed. David L. Andrews and Stephen Wagg (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 298.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 291.

VI. ACROSS THE GOAL LINE: CONCLUSION

In Chapter I of this thesis, several questions were laid out: How has sport been used to shape national identity through mass politics? What role does sport serve in government and international relations? Will sport and international sporting competitions continue to have the impact in the future that they once enjoyed in the twentieth century? This thesis certainly does not provide an all-encompassing, concrete answer to each of these questions, but it does provide examples of each. Thus, this thesis provides more color to the canvas of a painting of the understanding of history, particularly the Cold War period.

As mankind evolved through the millennia from the hunter-gatherers of the earliest times, it was a near constant state of warfare over several hundred years in Europe in which the modern state was born.⁴⁰⁸ However, for the state to become powerful, and retain that power, there needed to exist what Schulze called a “powerful justification” to keep those European states from “disintegrating” into civil war.⁴⁰⁹ Nationalism was that justification.⁴¹⁰ The concept of a national identity drove people to place the state above themselves and by the end of the eighteenth century the ideas of an “abstract nation” and an “imagined community” based on ethnic, cultural, and geographic myths had fueled the birth of the first modern nation-state.⁴¹¹ The nationalistic ideology and myths propagated by the educated classes of the time required mediums through which to be passed on to the masses. Sport and physical culture provided one such medium.

Several European states suffered significant military defeats during the nineteenth century and thus, the pride of many citizens within those states was severely damaged as well. Educated members of those societies sought ways in which to restore lost prestige. Gymnastics was seen by many as a way in which to create strong, healthy soldiers for the

⁴⁰⁸ Schulze, *States, Nations and Nationalism*, 37-38;

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., 91.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ O’Neil, *Essentials of Comparative Politics*, 52; Berend, *Decades of Crisis*, 51.

next war while, at the same time, serving as a medium through which to pass propagate nationalist ideology. In providing a means to “condition the population,” the gymnastic movements promoted by men such as Jahn, Tyrs, Ling, and Lesgaft “preserved and extended the awareness that national consciousness is best expressed through liturgy and symbols, in festivals and their surroundings,” but they were first and foremost intended to “equip boys for the call to arms.”⁴¹²

It was that very desire to prepare young men for war which had a strong influence in inspiring Baron de Coubertin to study athletics and physical education in British schools, and implement similar methods in France. De Coubertin grew to believe that sport was a way through which to bring peoples of different cultures and backgrounds together enhancing “international friendship and understanding,” thus driving him to establish the modern Olympic games at the end of the nineteenth century.⁴¹³ Despite de Coubertin’s efforts, politicians viewed sport and the Olympics “as a means of reinforcing national identity and spectators experienced a ‘vicarious identification’ with the triumph of a national team.”⁴¹⁴ The nationalistic fervor of the nineteenth century – strongly fostered by the gymnastic movements of the same era – had created ethnic, racial, and geographic tensions so great they eventually led to the First World War.

It was after World War I when sport really became an adjunct of politics, particularly in several totalitarian regimes in Europe.⁴¹⁵ Centralized and controlled by the state, sport and physical education were ways of controlling citizens during their leisure time, in their private life and in their social relations. Controlling sport enabled the regime to study and manipulate young people and their skills. At the same time, sport was a means of promoting and spreading...ideology at home and abroad.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹² Schulze, *States, Nations and Nationalism*, 94 and 136.

⁴¹³ Strenk, “What Price Victory?” 138.

⁴¹⁴ Maynard Brichford, “Avery Brundage and the American Nationalism at the Olympic Games,” in *The Global Nexus Engaged: Past, Present, Future Interdisciplinary Olympic Studies: Sixth International Symposium for Olympic Research*, ed. Robert K. Barney, Scott G. Martyn and Kevin B. Wamsley (London: International Centre for Olympic Studies, University of Western Ontario, 2002), 223-226.

⁴¹⁵ James Riordan, introduction to *Sport and International Politics*, ed. Pierre Arnaud and James Riordan (London and New York: E & FN Spon, 1998), 1.

⁴¹⁶ Teja, “Italian sport and international relations under fascism,” 147.

Sport became a vehicle of propaganda and was used as a unifier in such places as the communist Soviet Union, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany where state-sponsored exclusion of Jews from sporting competitions and athletic clubs preceded Hitler's attempted Final Solution. Where sport was a tool of the state in unifying one group within society around a particular ideology, it created enemies and villains out of those deemed unworthy of inclusion. However, as nationalistic anxiety in Europe intensified several of these regimes shifted the focus of their physical education programs simply from a means to convey state-sponsored ideologies to a means of creating a population skilled in military readiness to defend the Motherland and Fatherland. Physical fitness became a "national [and] class duty."⁴¹⁷

When World War II concluded, the former allies of the Soviet Union and the United States found themselves at odds with one another and the two spheres of influence they enjoyed domination over, the communist East and the capitalist West, became engulfed in the Cold War. It was during this period when the Soviets shifted the focus of their system of physical culture from the promotion of hygiene, health, and defense as they continued to strive to catch up to the West, to one in which proving the superiority of their socialist system to the rest of the world through international sporting victories became a priority. Arguably, the Cold War era witnessed the largest use of sport by the state as a means of political gain than any other era in history.

As previously discussed in Chapter II, there are several potential ways in which states and governments can use sport to their advantage, but deliberate government use of sport, however, is not necessary in order for sport to have a significant impact. Such is the case with the examples in Chapters III, IV, and V. Unlike the 1936 Olympic Games which Nazi Germany deliberately planned to use as a means to display the grandeur and superiority of Germany and the German peoples, the hockey games which are the subject of the previous three chapters provided an opportunity for state and government use *after* their conclusion, though not all in a traditional manner.

⁴¹⁷ Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel*, 95-96.

Though the people of Czechoslovakia were able to resist their Soviet occupiers after defeating the Soviet Union at the 1969 World Ice Hockey Championship through public celebrations, it was the Soviets who saw an opportunity to force the removal of the reformist leader Dubcek from power in Czechoslovakia citing his inability to control the crowds when they turned violent and vandalized Soviet vehicles and installations as a direct result of the outcome of a hockey game. It is ironic that when the Czechoslovaks found a way to overcome their oppressors – by beating them at ice hockey – the oppressors were able to turn it around into a political victory for themselves solidifying the end to the reforms of the Prague Spring and the implementation of normalization.

In the case of Canada, a country that was struggling with its national identity in the period following World War II, its victory over the Soviet Union in the eight-game Summit Series in 1972 provided relief from the threat of losing what was widely accepted as its national sport and highly regarded as defining themselves as Canadian, ice hockey, to a nation state that had already striped the powerful United States of its international dominance in a sport highly associated with Americanism, basketball, earlier that same year. Where the United States had failed in thwarting the Soviet Union's quest to prove the superiority of the socialist system through learning another country's sport and then besting them at it, Canada was able to prevail and in the course preserve a large part of what was perceived as defining a Canadian as Canadian.

In yet a different example of government exploitation of a sporting victory for political gain, the case involving the victory of the U.S. hockey team over the Soviet hockey team at the 1980 Winter Olympics in Lake Placid, President Carter and his administration took advantage of the hockey team's success over America's Cold War nemesis at a bleak time in American history. Not only was the entire team named Sportsmen of the Year by Sports Illustrated in 1980, the victory over the Soviets was

voted the “most memorable sports moment of the twentieth century.”⁴¹⁸ The victory rejuvenated the spirits of a beleaguered nation, and arguably inspired the policies of future presidential administrations.

History is rife with examples of sport and physical culture being manipulated for political gain. This fact draws attention that China will soon have the chance to do the same with the 2008 Summer Olympiad being held in Beijing. A communist nation-state that is under heavy scrutiny by the international community for human rights violations and its policies regarding Tibet, China has an opportunity to generate a significant of positive media for itself.⁴¹⁹ European Olympic Committee President Pat Hickey commented on China’s opportunity during a visit to Malta in August, 2007 stating

I am sure these Games will be the best ever, in fact, as never before. Certainly, they will be fantastic and it will be something very positive for that country [China]. In fact, I believe, they will open up China to the world. However, a great deal of media coverage has been devoted to protests around the world.⁴²⁰

However, protests against China’s continuing human rights violations and policies towards Tibet have generated a great deal of negative media particularly in regards to boycotting of the opening ceremonies called for by American politicians and Olympic torch relay-runners being forced to extinguish the Olympic flame in the face of pro-Tibetan protests in Paris.⁴²¹

Indeed, China has its hands full in hosting the 2008 Summer Olympics, but they are determined to gain something as a nation by hosting the Games. Hickey made it clear that China is out to upstage its fiercest competitor in the world right now, the United States. “The Chinese are preparing well for these Games as they wish to top the medals’

⁴¹⁸ Sportsman of the Year Archive, SI.com, <http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/magazine/specials/sportsman/archive/1980/>; “Miracle, The Sequel,” SI.com, <http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2006/hockey/nhl/11/10/flashback.brooks/index.html> (accessed May 4, 2008).

⁴¹⁹ Demian McLean, “Olympic Torch Relay Upstaged as Protests Span Globe (Update1),” Bloomberg.com, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=arieG_SnGGs (accessed April 8, 2008).

⁴²⁰ Henry Brincat, “EOC president Pat Hickey in Malta,” The Malta Independent Online, <http://www.independent.com.mt/news.asp?newsitemid=56390> (accessed August 30, 2007).

⁴²¹ McLean, “Olympic Torch Relay Upstaged as Protests Span Globe.”

list ahead of the Americans who will be their main challengers.”⁴²² Defeating the Americans in the Olympics may not convince the rest of the world that the Chinese way of life is way of the future, but it will certainly go a long way in reinforcing current beliefs in China where the state still controls much of the media and information flow.

Since the end of the Cold War, international sporting competition appears to have lost much of the intensity that had fueled it during that era. The Russian national team defeated Canada in the 2008 World Ice Hockey Championship⁴²³ – NATO did not collapse and Canada did not disintegrate as a nation state, nor did Putin seize the opportunity to send Spetsnaz troops into Nova Scotia. Surely some celebrations occurred somewhere, but no political leaders were ousted and international relations have not suffered as a result.

All too often, sport and physical culture are neglected in regards to its impact on international relations and society. However, the simple fact of the matter is that sport has “involved more players, spectators and officials than any other social movement.”⁴²⁴ In the U.S. alone in 1998, \$39.1 billion was spent on sporting and recreational activities – “a major part of the U.S. economy.”⁴²⁵ Sport provides an aspect of a personal sense of identity for many people and allows them to experience heightened self-esteem and a sense of belonging. It becomes all too dangerous when it is manipulated to create an exclusive sense of identity and fosters hatred toward others deemed unworthy of that identity. The atrocities of the twentieth century were not that long ago, and nothing should be considered insignificant when human life becomes the ultimate cost.

Human beings are supposed to have continually evolved and progressed in the time they have inhabited this planet. This veteran of the long war suggests the following: what a wonderful world it would be, if actual international disputes could eventually be settled on a sheet of ice with men brandishing hockey sticks and knocking each others’

⁴²² Brincat, “EOC president Pat Hickey in Malta.”

⁴²³ “2008 IIHF World Championship,” Hockey Canada, http://www.hockeycanada.ca/index.cfm/ci_id/21256/la_id/1.htm (accessed May 23, 2008).

⁴²⁴ Riordan, introduction to *Sport and International Politics*, 1.

⁴²⁵ David Karen and Robert E. Washington, “Sport and Society,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 27 (2001): 187.

teeth out in an on-ice fight, while following the honor-code of the hockey enforcer by letting up when the opponent is rendered at a disadvantage – the victor indisputably recognized by all and nobody dies. One can only dream.

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